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ABSTRACT 
 
Among the reasons for financial exclusion is the fact that the poor, being largely 
illiterate and unemployed, are traditionally perceived as ‘bad credit risks’.  This is the 
dominant perception of the poor in the formal credit markets – a perception that also 
exists in the microcredit sector. In other words, while information asymmetry is a 
recognized problem in lender-borrower relationships, lenders consider the problem 
particularly severe when they contemplate doing business with the poor.  
A contrasting paradigm, such as the one adopted by Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, 
views the poor as possessing economic potentials that have not been tapped – that is, 
as ‘good credit risks’.  Grameen Bank’s microcredit features appear to have 
successfully mitigated the problems of information asymmetry and, to a large extent, 
made it possible for the poor to access microenterprise credit. 
Using the Grameen Bank model as a benchmark, this study examined the lending 
features of private sector microlenders in South Africa and those of KhulaStart 
(credit) scheme.  The aim was to identify how the lending features affect 
microenterprise credit access. Primary data were obtained through interviews, while 
relevant secondary data were also used in the study.  
A key finding of the study was that while the Khulastart scheme was, like 
Grameencredit, targeted at the poor, the method of its delivery appeared diluted or 
unduly influenced by the conventional (private sector) paradigm that pre-classifies 
people as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ credit risks.  As a result, the scheme was not robust enough 
to support microenterprise credit access. This has consequences for job-creation and 
poverty reduction.  Based on the findings, the study maintains that a realistic 
broadening of microenterprise credit access will not occur unless there is a 
fundamental paradigm shift in microcredit practices, and unless measures designed to 
mitigate information asymmetries are sensitive to the historical, economic and socio-
cultural realities of the South African poor. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Context of the Study 
 
A major issue with the financial sector is that commercial banks and the capital 
markets do not satisfactorily perform their ‘financial intermediary function of 
transferring resources from savers to investors’ (Annan, 1998:2).  Often, due to 
infrastructure problems, information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, 
adherence to conventional, neoliberal commercial banking ethos, and factors in the 
national policy environment, banks are reluctant to lend to the poor.  The result is the 
exclusion of large groups of people from the financial system.  In developing 
countries, where this problem is particularly severe, the challenge is that of putting in 
place policies and strategies to bring the excluded into the mainstream of financial 
and credit services.     
 
In South Africa, the reality of widespread exclusion and unmet demand for financial 
services and credit extension is glaring (Hawkins, 2001: 32). Although famed for its 
sophistication (MFRC, 2000:5), with services and standards rivalling those of many 
industrialized Western countries, the country’s financial sector has paradoxically 
failed to make its products and services available to a vast segment of the population.  
 
A 1998 All Media and Products Survey (AMPS) finding that 58% of the adult South 
African population had only ‘very little access to formal banking’ (Hawkins, 
2001:30), provides a hint as to the extent of financial exclusion and credit extension in 
the country. While the microcredit market is ordinarily the last resort for those 
excluded from formal sector credit, in the South African case, a large number of 
people, especially the poor, have no access to the services provided in this alternative 
market.  Even so, in the microcredit sector it is not always easy to determine what 
people actually do with the loans they obtain.  All this can be summed up in a few key 
questions.  One, how accessible are microcredit services in South Africa?  Two, what 
is the dominant type of credit in the South African microcredit sector and who are the 
main beneficiaries?  Three, to what extent does the microcredit model in use in South 
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Africa bolster the growth of the microenterprise sector?  This thesis seeks to address 
these various questions. 
 
Research attention is increasingly being focused on the links between microcredit and 
the growth of microenterprise sector; indeed, on the links between microcredit and 
poverty reduction.  Some have suggested that microenterprise credit is a viable tool 
for creating employment and reducing poverty, and that this should be the dominant 
form of microcredit in developing countries  (Zeller and Sharma, 2000; Shaw, 2004).  
Underlining its importance in helping the world’s poor to move out of poverty, 
Mohammed Yunus (cited in Coetzee, 1993:3) refers to microenterprise credit as ‘a 
kind of capitalism from below’ and a ‘strategy for economic self reliance’ (see also 
Johnson 1992: 275).  
 
Some scholars hold a contrary view, or at best maintain that microenterprise credit 
should be adopted with caution.  For example, Scully (2004:1) and Bates et al (1996) 
argue that the idea that the poor derive any meaningful benefits from microcredit 
programmes is a myth, since microloans are usually so small that they can only 
generate meagre revenues for those who use such loans for business purposes. The 
persistence of extreme poverty in Bangladesh despite the substantial penetration of 
microfinance is also sometimes used to challenge the efficacy of microfinance as a 
poverty-reduction tool (Mcguire et al, 1998; SDC, 2004).  Annan (1998:4) argues that 
without the right complementing packages (such as appropriate technology and skills 
development) microenterprise credit as a poverty reduction-tool will come to nothing.   
 
According to Fernando (2003), the above limitations do not override the benefits of 
microcredit.  He maintains that microfinance can be made to work for the poor, 
especially if the state intervenes.  However, such intervention must go beyond simply 
making the ‘environment conducive’ to microfinance operations: the state must be 
actively involved in the provision of microfinance services.   
 
The first interventionist attempt at broadening access to credit was initiated in 
Bangladesh in 1976.  At first an action research project – known as Grameen Bank 
Project – the initiative evolved into a statutory microfinance institution in 1983.  Its 
mandate was to provide banking services to the rural poor, eliminate the exploitation 
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of the poor by informal money lenders, and create opportunities for the unemployed 
to become self-employed (Grameen Bank, 2004a:1).  By reversing traditional banking 
practices and lending without insisting on collateral, Grameen Bank pioneered a 
lending model that seemed to be realistically based on mutual trust, accountability, 
participation and creativity – and thus debunked the general perception that the 
problem of information asymmetry is necessarily more severe in the microcredit 
sector (which traditionally services the poor).  Arguably on account of these 
attributes, the bank reportedly recorded, as of 2004, a 99% loan recovery rate and a 
100% dependence on own resources for loan finance.  It also eliminated the need for 
future donor support (Grameen Bank, 2004a:1), despite having started out with such 
support and government subsidies (Morduch, 1999). 
 
In South Africa, the government established Khula Enterprise Finance Limited in 
1996 as an intervention agency, with the aim of facilitating access to credit for small, 
medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) (Khula Enterprise Finance Ltd, 2001).  
Although allegedly bedevilled by corruption and lack of sound organisation (Sunday 
Times, 2001), the KhulaStart scheme is believed to have benefited a fairly large 
number of microentrepreneurs in the country and helped to create jobs in the informal 
sector.   
 
Using Grameen Bank as a benchmark, this research examines the lending features of 
private sector microcredit operators in South Africa.  It also examines KhulaStart, the 
microcredit model upon which it is based, and the operational practices of its retail 
outlets.  The aim is to compare these with the lending features and operational 
practices of Grameen Bank and also draw some lessons from the Grameen Bank 
model of microcredit for South Africa. 
 
1.2 Goals of the study 
 
This research examines the Grameen Bank model of microcredit in order to ascertain 
its relevance in South Africa.  Specifically, the research:  
   
1. Explores the KhulaStart scheme and the lending practices of private sector 
microcredit operators in South Africa. 
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2. Examines how lending practices affect microenterprise credit access.   
3. Examines Grameen Bank’s microcredit features and compares these with 
microcredit practice in South Africa. 
 
In pursuit of the above goals, the study relies on both primary and secondary data.  
The primary data were obtained through interviews conducted with KhulaStart 
microcredit outlets in Port Elizabeth and Mthatha, as well as with selected registered 
private sector microlenders in Grahamstown - all in the Eastern Cape Province of 
South Africa.   
 
Ten registered private sector microlenders in Grahamstown (out of a total of 15) were 
selected and interviewed to determine the character of microlending in the private 
sector.  The interview elicited information on, among other issues, loan type, loan 
eligibility criteria, loan size, interest rates, monitoring of end use of loan, and 
repayment terms. 
 
The two KhulaStart microcredit outlets selected for the study were Hlumisanani in 
Port Elizabeth and Libec in Mthatha.  The interview sought to identify how the 
lending features and operational practices of these outlets affect microenterprise credit 
access in their areas of coverage. 
 
One of the main sources of secondary data on Grameen Bank was a one-hour 
documentary on the bank done by the cable television network, Discovery Channel, 
which the researcher was privileged to access.  Earlier research done on the bank also 
provided valuable data.  Data on specific features of the bank’s lending model (such 
as lending without collateral, group lending, lending to women, and client-seeking) 
were obtained from the bank’s website, and from articles by the bank’s founder, 
Muhammed Yunus.  Secondary information on microlending practices in South 
Africa and statistics from the Microfinance Regulatory Council (MFRC) were utilized 
to complement the survey of private sector microlending practices.  
 
Using tables and graphs, the study makes a descriptive comparison of the lending 
features and operational practices of Grameen Bank, KhulaStart and private sector 
microlenders in South Africa.  This helps to show where the main features of the 
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various microlenders differ, and what aspects of the Grameen Bank model might be 
applicable in South Africa. 
 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
 
This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter two brings into focus the influence 
of information asymmetry on the provision of formal sector credit, on the design of 
microcredit products, and on the definition of what constitute ‘good’ and ‘bad’ credit 
risks.  It examines information asymmetry and the methods employed in the 
conventional formal credit markets to mitigate problems associated with it, highlights 
the peculiar challenges information asymmetry poses to the microcredit markets, and 
shows how attempts to apply conventional credit risk management measures 
compound the problems of microenterprise credit access.  Overall, the chapter makes 
a case for moving beyond conventional frameworks and approaches in order to unlock 
the economic potentials of that segment of the South African population traditionally 
regarded as a bad credit risk. 
 
Chapter three looks at the statutory framework and examines the extent to which 
microcredit operations help in employment creation and poverty reduction.  This is 
done against the backdrop of what is now commonly referred to as South Africa’s 
‘two economies’ – a concept the chapter also critically examines.  Some specific 
features of the South African microcredit industry and the various categories of 
microlenders are also examined.  On the whole, the chapter seeks to show that the 
present statutory framework for microcredit operations in South Africa not only 
supports consumption credit but also inhibits the growth of the microenterprise sector. 
 
Central to this thesis is the Grameen Bank microcredit model and its widely reported 
impact on the microenterprise sector in Bangladesh. Chapter four is devoted to an 
examination of the lending and operational features of this bank, and in particular, 
how the revolutionary assumption that people, even the poor, are good credit risks 
until proved otherwise drives the bank’s everyday microcredit operations.  The 
chapter offers a brief overview of the Bangladeshi economy, traces the history of 
Grameen Bank, examines some specific organisational and lending features of the 
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bank, and offers some insights into the ‘successes’ and ‘shortcomings’ associated with 
the bank’s lending features.  
 
Chapter five is concerned with the presentation and analysis of the various primary 
and secondary data collected for the study.  The chapter analyses the fieldwork 
findings concerning the lending activities of KhulaStart retail outlets and the 
registered private sector microlenders in South Africa.  Secondary data from the 
Microfinance Regulatory Council (MFRC) and Grameen Bank are also analysed.  
Most importantly, the chapter compares the lending and organisational features of the 
various categories of microcredit operators, and draws attention to some findings 
concerning the Grameen Bank model that could be of relevance to South Africa.   
 
Chapter six is the concluding chapter.  It appraises the research findings discussed in 
chapter five and comes to specific conclusions based on them.  The chapter also 
highlights the limitations of the research, offers some recommendations based on the 
findings and also points to some future research directions.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND ITS INFLUENCE  
ON LENDING PRACTICES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Among the factors associated with financial exclusion is information asymmetry.  
This is because the poor, being largely illiterate, unemployed and lacking assets that 
can be used as collateral, are traditionally perceived as ‘bad credit risks’.  This 
perception of the poor is deeply entrenched in the formal credit markets - and it is the 
main reason the poor find it difficult to access the services provided in this sector.  
Especially in the developing countries, where the problem of poverty is enormous, 
and where, in many cases, financial institutions lack adequate infrastructure and the 
capacity to cater for the financial needs of the population (Kitchen 1986: 115, 
Schreiner, 2000), banks typically restrict their credit services to those they perceive as 
having good economic standing.  Banks have traditionally mitigated the problems of 
information asymmetry using standardized measures such as collateral, credit 
rationing, screening, monitoring and enforcement of restrictive covenants.  However, 
these measures are part of a mindset that pre-classifies people as either good or bad 
credit risks. 
 
The problem of information asymmetry is generally believed to be particularly severe 
in the microcredit sector.  This is not merely because information is not available 
about the target market; that is, people with little or no access to formal sector credit.  
Rather, it is mainly because lenders in this market do not have information about the 
productive potentials of the poor, who constitute the majority of those traditionally 
excluded from formal credit.  This chapter - indeed, this thesis - brings into focus the 
influence of information asymmetry on the design of microcredit products and the 
definition of what constitute ‘good’ and ‘bad’ credit risks.  Most importantly, the 
chapter shows how information asymmetry reinforces the exclusion of the poor from 
the financial system.   
 
The chapter is divided into five sections.  The next three sections examine information 
asymmetry and the methods employed in the conventional formal credit markets to 
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mitigate problems associated with it.  These three sections also highlight the peculiar 
challenges information asymmetry poses to the microcredit markets and show how 
attempts to apply conventional credit risk management measures compound the 
problems of microenterprise credit access.  Section five highlights the imperative of 
moving beyond conventional frameworks and approaches in order to unlock the 
economic potentials of that segment of the South African population traditionally 
regarded as a bad credit risk.  Concluding remarks are reserved for the last section. 
 
2.2 The Role of Information in the Financial System 
 
For financial institutions to effectively perform their intermediation function, 
information of reliable quality and quantity is essential.  In addition to helping lenders 
and borrowers to make efficient financial decisions, accurate information helps 
investors to know what returns their investments would bring (Hubbard, 1997:40).  
Before granting a loan, a lender wants to have as much information as possible about 
the potential borrower.  This includes information on business involvements, 
economic assets and reasons for seeking a loan – in short, as much detail as will help 
the lender to ascertain the applicant’s credit-worthiness.  On the other hand, potential 
borrowers know that their chances of obtaining a loan depend on their ability to 
present as positive a picture as possible about themselves.  This ‘game’ – as Molho 
(1997:13) calls it – is a common feature of lender-borrower transactions. 
  
Imperfect information is considered a major factor in market failure and missing 
markets, and partly explains why information disclosure forms a major part of 
financial regulations worldwide.  In South Africa, the Banking Act requires banks to 
publish their accounting information and make it readily accessible to the public 
(BCSA, 2004).  Although information disclosure in the banking system is often 
criticized as insufficient - given its critical role in the system - the mandate for banks 
to publish their accounting information still serves the intended purpose of helping 
interested parties to make efficient decisions.  Independent institutions also have 
specific requirements.  For example, it is compulsory for companies wishing to raise 
equity capital to comply with specific disclosure obligations (JSE, 2004). As 
Goodhart (1989:21) has pointed out, ‘where sufficient information exists and is freely 
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available, efficient and successful markets can be established but where this is not the 
case, markets will not work perfectly’.   
 
2.3 Information Asymmetries in Formal Credit Markets 
 
As pointed out earlier, information asymmetry is a situation whereby important 
information is not available, or is partially available.  Kreps (1989: 8-9) defines it as a 
situation in which one party ‘possessed of superior information, attempts a transaction 
with a second party who lacks that information’.  In a financial transaction, borrowers 
tend to have an informational advantage because they know more about themselves 
than the lenders. The situation plays out in the following way: first, borrowers 
misrepresent their risk characteristics in order to get access to credit and to secure 
more favourable terms.  Second, if the lender views the potential borrower as a bad 
credit risk, unfavourable loan terms will be presented as a way of adjusting for the 
perceived bad risk.  Third, the borrower accepts the terms, not knowing that a high 
price has been put on his risk status; indeed, he believes he has played his game right! 
 
The most important consequence of the above game, as originally identified by 
George Akerlof (1970: 495), is adverse selection - also sometimes referred to as pre-
contractual opportunism or market for lemons.  Adverse selection leads to a high 
probability of loan default.  In reality, because of the problem of adverse selection the 
financial system operates rather cautiously, as though the market were an endless 
mass of people who lacked the ability or integrity to repay loans, when perhaps there 
are as many good credit risks as there are bad ones (Mishkin, 2004: 32). 
 
Information asymmetry in the financial system also necessarily brings about a self-
fulfilling prophecy known as moral hazard (or post-contractual opportunism).   It is 
often the case that borrowers change their risk profile after they have secured the loan 
simply because it is difficult, or costly, for the lender to monitor their behaviour.  
More specifically, there is a high probability that borrowers will undertake business 
activities that are more risky than first presented.  The consequence is that borrowed 
money does not get repaid in time, if at all. This reality may discourage lenders from 
giving loans and reinforces the notion of the average borrower as a credit risk.  For 
this reason, Hillier (1997:5) suggests that lenders should monitor the activities of 
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borrowers after a loan has been granted even if by engaging the services of auditors.  
Hillier, however, notes that this may raise loan administration costs, and could even 
introduce legal complications, especially if post-lending monitoring had not been 
spelt out in the lending contract.   
 
The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard affect the efficient functioning of 
the credit market (Studart, 1997: 42).  They sometimes also give rise to ‘financial 
panic’ - a situation whereby ‘providers of funds to financial intermediaries withdraw 
their funds out of both sound and unsound institutions’ because they no longer trust 
the ‘health’ of the intermediaries (Mishkin and Eakins, 2003: 30).  If this situation 
arises, it may produce large losses for the public and cause serious damage to the 
economy. 
 
Government regulations help to mitigate the problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazards in the financial sector.  For example, such regulations permit only credible 
individuals or groups to set up financial institutions (Mishin and Eakins, 2003: 30).  
Regulations also make financial disclosure mandatory, and define permissible limits 
within which banks can compete with one another.  
 
On their part, banks and other financial institutions have developed risk management 
measures for dealing with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazards.  
These include screening, specialization in lending, monitoring and enforcement of 
restrictive covenants, long-term customer relationships, loan commitments, collateral 
and compensating balances, and credit rationing.  However, as shown in the next 
section, the use of these various measures is based on the underlying assumption 
that people are bad credit risks until proved otherwise. (Chapter four of this work 
shows that Grameen Bank’s success is principally a function of the bank’s 
revolutionary adoption of an opposite position – that is: people, even the poor, are 
good credit risks until proved otherwise.) This is the fundamental problem of 
conventional notions of credit risk, and why the poor are always excluded from 
formal sector credit.  It is also the main problem with uncritical adaptation of 
conventional measures to tackle risk-related problems in the microcredit sector.  In 
other words, some of the measures explained below automatically screen out the poor, 
and make it difficult for – as the cliché goes - credit to go to where credit is due. 
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 2.3 Conventional Credit Risk Management Measures 
 2.3.1 Screening 
 
Screening is meant to prevent, or mitigate, adverse selection and is carried out by 
means of interviews, supporting documentation and other checks on personal risk 
characteristics of borrowers.  Scoring systems are often used to ascertain the credit 
worthiness of the potential borrower.  The higher the score the better the rating and 
people with the highest scores get the lowest interest rates (Curry, 2003).  Also, credit 
bureaus are used to check the credit history – and, hence, the credit-worthiness - of 
the potential client.  It is highly unlikely that the poor will meet many of the 
conventional criteria for ascertaining credit-worthiness.  
2.3.2 Specialization in lending 
 
Banks sometimes lend only to specific industries or sectors of the economy.  
Specialization in lending makes them knowledgeable about certain industries, such 
that identifying ‘good’ and ‘bad’ credit risks becomes relatively easier.  Over time, 
this lending relationship provides the banks with a store of information that would 
otherwise be unobtainable, or obtainable at a considerable cost.  Banks prefer this 
approach not only because it saves the cost of obtaining information about new firms, 
but also because it reduces the possibility of adverse selection (Rodriquez and Carbo, 
2004: 9). Specialization in lending, however, puts the poor outside the reach of formal 
credit. 
2.3.3 Monitoring and enforcement of restrictive covenants 
 
Certain provisions in the loan contract prevent borrowers from engaging in particular 
businesses. Such provisions include: instructions as to end-use of the loan, 
prerequisite periodic accounting and income reporting, and prohibitions of behaviour 
considered risky (Mishkin, 2004:225). Acceptance of the contract means a borrower 
gives the bank the authority to monitor compliance.  This reduces moral hazard. 
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2.3.4 Long-term customer relationships 
 
Maintaining a relationship with borrowers helps lenders to understand their credit 
needs and credit-worthiness.  It also lowers the cost of collecting information from 
existing borrowers, and makes it possible for people to access loans relatively easily 
and possibly at lower interest rates.  Generally, borrowers consider long-term 
customer relationships valuable and may not want to engage in activities that may 
breach existing trusts.  In this way, moral hazards may be reduced (Mishkin, 
2004:225). 
 
In cases of severe competition among banks, relationship lending may be beneficial 
in fostering a strong bond between a bank and its clients to the extent that the bank 
enjoys continuous patronage and loyalty from its clients, and vice versa (Degryse and 
Ongena, 2003:31).  Whether the poor have the formal credentials upon which 
relationship lending in its conventional sense can be initiated at all is a different 
matter entirely. 
 2.3.5 Loan commitments 
 
Loan commitments are arrangements and obligations that banks enter into with 
existing borrowers. Essentially it involves banks promising to provide credit to 
preferred customers whenever the need arises and at an agreed interest rate.  This 
commitment obliges borrowers to constantly and regularly supply the banks with 
information that could be used in assessing their financial standing or credit needs. 
Clearly loan commitments are made only to preferred bank customers. 
2.3.6 Collateral and compensating balances 
 
This is one of the most frequently used risk management tools – and, arguably, one of 
the most obvious ways by which the poor are excluded from formal sector credit 
(Ghosh et al 2000:390).  By requiring borrowers to provide collateral - usually 
property - as security against default, banks not only establish borrowers’ credit-
worthiness, but also indirectly place a check against reckless use of borrowed funds.  
Because the borrower knows that the collateral will be forfeited in the event of 
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repayment default, the likelihood is that he or she will channel the funds only to the 
contracted business ends.  
 
A related way by which adverse selection and moral hazards are mitigated is that 
banks require large firms to hold compensating balances, usually a certain proportion 
of the loan, in the borrowers’ account.  In the event of loan default, such balances 
could be used to compensate for losses incurred by the bank.  
 
Although there is no conclusive evidence that collateral is an infallible security 
against loan default (see Berger and Udell 1990: 40), it has historically been seen as 
an important tool for mitigating moral hazard in credit-related banking transactions.  
Such was the fear of moral hazard that some banks in the United States of America in 
the past encouraged slave trade by asking for and accepting slaves as collateral 
(Finance 24, 2005). Even in pre-colonial Africa, borrowers often pledged their 
children or relatives as collateral (Law, 1999: 25). 
2.3.7 Credit rationing 
 
Through credit rationing banks refuse, in some cases, to issue loans even if the 
borrower is willing to pay a higher interest rate or accept a smaller loan than required.  
Large amounts, lenders believe, encourage moral hazard and so credit rationing 
(despite the obvious effect of reducing bank’s profits) help them to manage credit 
risks.   
 
According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981:1), credit rationing arises because ‘prices do 
not do their job’.  Where the market is in disequilibrium there is bound to be excess 
demand for, or short supply of, loanable funds.  This excess credit demand comprises 
both potentially good credit risk and bad credit risk.  Since prices do not adjust to 
bring about a new equilibrium, banks ration credit in the short term to be able to cope 
with these pressures.  They, thus, only grant credit to those they consider good credit 
risks, again effectively excluding the poor.  
 
Finally, conventional credit risk-management measures effectively screen out possible 
beneficiaries of loans for microenterprises.  For example, banks may require 
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borrowers to provide collateral, or maintain compensating balances, in order to 
qualify for loans. Potential and existing microenterprise clients rarely have any 
bankable collateral and the compensating balances may be burdensome (Rhyne and 
Otero, 1994: 25).  Because microenterprises serve a developmental purpose in the 
economy, Rhyne and Otero urge governments to encourage banks to adapt standards 
governing loan collateral approval and documentation to accommodate 
microenterprise credit. 
 
2.4 Information Asymmetries in Informal Credit Markets 
 
Microcredit is informal credit that operates mostly in a non-bank market.  It arises 
mainly because, as earlier shown, the formal credit sector pre-classifies some 
borrowers as bad credit risks and uses the measures discussed above to screen them 
out.  It is against this background that microcredit emerged.  Microcredit helps people 
to meet their short-term consumption needs, and is also an important source of funds 
for microenterprises. In many developing countries, it is seen as a vital tool for 
promoting microenterprises, creating employment and reducing poverty. 
 
Information asymmetry is compounded in the microcredit markets because most 
potential clients of this market are rejects of the formal credit sector, and they are 
rejects mainly because of the conventional assumptions about credit risks and the 
measures used for risk mitigation in the formal markets.  While many microcredit 
clients are salary and low-income earners, the great majority of potential clients are 
typically people with no reliable sources of income, no fixed business premises, and 
no reliable physical addresses.  These attributes present information asymmetry.  
Lenders prefer to deal with people that can be easily traced to places of employment 
or residence, and people with regular income streams.  People that do not meet these 
parameters are considered special cases of adverse selection and moral hazard.  
Ironically, potential microenterprise borrowers are the ones most often seen in this 
light. 
 
As the data in Chapter Five of this work show, loan products in the microcredit sector 
are often designed in such a way that they do not get entangled in the problems of 
asymmetrical information.  Indeed, this explains the dominance of consumption credit 
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as the preferred type of microcredit in South Africa: consumption credit clients are 
mostly people in formal (government and private sector) employment.  It may even be 
argued that the South African microcredit sector flounders because of its 
unwillingness (MFRC 2000) to mitigate the problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazards and open up the microcredit sector to microenterprise borrowers. 
 
As indicated earlier – and demonstrated with empirical and secondary data in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six of this work - the South African microcredit sector 
operates largely with the same fundamental assumptions of the conventional (formal) 
lending sector: it sees the poor as bad credit risks, to be either avoided or courted with 
caution.  Because people are assumed as ‘bad credit risks’ until proved otherwise, the 
South African microcredit sector faces a major challenge of developing lending and 
credit management mechanisms that effectively bring the poor into the mainstream of 
economic activities. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the problems associated with information asymmetries in 
both the formal and microcredit sectors. It has showed that in trying to tackle the 
problems of information asymmetry, institutions in the formal financial sector have 
over time developed measures that have had the consequence of excluding the poor 
from formal credit.  The chapter pointed out that these measures are rooted in the 
conventional notion that the poor are bad credit risks – an assumption that also drives 
lending practices in the microcredit sector. 
 
Proper microcredit intermediation is essential to stimulate economic activities in the 
historically excluded segments of the South African population. If microcredit were 
principally for short-term consumption purposes, there would be little point in going 
beyond conventional lending practices and risk management techniques.  Indeed, 
there would be little point in portraying microcredit as a tool for employment creation 
and poverty reduction.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN MICROCREDIT INDUSTRY AND ITS STATUTORY 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
According to the 2000/2001 World Development Report, lack of access to financial 
services (such as savings and credit) is one of the principal causes of poverty (World 
Bank 2001).  The further away people are from the financial services available in an 
economy, the report points out, the greater the likelihood that they will sink into 
poverty.  The concept of microfinance emerged as a strategy to bring the excluded 
into the mainstream of financial life, and has been utilized in different countries with 
varying degrees of success.   
 
The main objective of this study, as stated in Chapter One, is to examine existing 
microlending practices in South Africa as they affect access to microenterprise credit.  
In line with this, the present chapter examines the statutory framework for microcredit 
operations in the country and its influence on actual practices.  The section 
immediately following overviews some features of the South African economy, with a 
special focus on what is now commonly termed ‘two economies’.  This puts the role 
of microcredit in perspective. Section three sketches the history of the South African 
microcredit industry, and examines the statutory framework for microcredit 
operations in the country.  Section five discusses the various categories and modes of 
operation of microlenders in the country.  On the whole, the chapter seeks to show 
that the present statutory framework not only supports consumption credit but also 
inhibits the growth of the microenterprise sector.   
 
3.2 The South African Economy – An Overview 
The World Bank (2004a) classifies South Africa as a middle-income country, with 
characteristics associated with developing economies.  Although having a per capita 
income of $2,610 (the fourth highest in Africa), South Africa is currently the world’s 
most unequal country (Bauman, 2001: 4).  Thirteen percent of the population (about 
5.4 million people) live in ‘first world’ conditions while 53% of the population (about 
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22 million people) live in ‘third world’ conditions.  The basic cause of widespread 
poverty in the country is its apartheid history.  Before 1994, the population was 
divided into racial groups – with whites enjoying all privileges and the black majority 
‘relegated to stark, inhumane servitude’ (World Bank, 2004a).  The post-apartheid 
government is thus faced with key challenges of reducing inequality and poverty, and 
tackling unemployment, which is regarded as among the highest in the world.  It is 
also faced with the task of correcting these historical imbalances by ‘channeling 
resources towards developing the informal sector, focusing on education and training, 
job creation and small business assistance’ (World Bank, 2004a). 
In 1996, the government adopted a Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
strategy, with the aim of fostering a more balanced economic growth.  Although the 
government has ensured macroeconomic stability through this strategy, some analysts 
believe that the goals of GEAR have remained largely unrealized, and that GEAR is 
out of touch with the unique South African situation. GEAR, the argument goes, 
promotes reduced government expenditure, which implies reducing expenditure on 
social welfare programmes upon which the poor ordinarily rely as a safety net (Roux, 
2002:169).  Others like Kingsnorth (2004) believe that GEAR has brought about more 
job losses than anticipated. 
South Africa has a strong formal sector.  By contrast, the informal sector is 
underdeveloped, and stimulating it has remained a difficult task for both the 
government and the private sector.  Informal businesses are run by low-income and 
self-employed people, commonly operating from inelegant surroundings. These 
businesses are generally patronized by low-income people and the unemployed.  
Toomey (1998:56-58) identifies retail bias and lack of sufficient human capital as 
factors that inhibit the growth of this sector.  While the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s (DTI’s) policy framework for the development of Small, Medium and 
Micro-Enterprise (SMME) sector in South Africa recognizes the need to create 
vibrant SMMEs within the manufacturing sector, existing structures seem to support 
only the retail sector, especially those one might refer to as survivalist retailers.  Yet, 
manufacturing has a greater survival and employment potential than retailing 
(Toomey 1998:56-58).  The country’s relatively strong social welfare sector has also 
been criticized as hampering the development of entrepreneurial skills in the large 
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segment of the population currently drawing social welfare support from the 
government.  In a word, the growth of the microenterprises will strengthen the SMME 
sector as a whole, and this depends, to a large extent, on the availability of skills and 
broad-based access to credit. 
3.2.1 South Africa and the concept of ‘two economies’ 
 
The term ‘two economies’ is now popularly used, especially in South African political 
circles, to describe the obvious contrast between the country’s sophisticated ‘first 
world-like’ industrial, mining, agricultural, financial, telecommunication and 
transport sectors, and the ‘third world-like’ informal and underdeveloped sector.  
While this phrase appears a simple and straightforward way to describe the contrast, 
the reality of that contrast is not that simple.  Although this work will not delve into 
the debates surrounding this concept, it suffices to say that the ‘two economies’ 
concept is derived from the dualist theory of economic growth as formulated by 
Arthur Lewis.  The theory erroneously saw developing countries as characterized by 
two sectors, each governed by a different set of laws: 
 
These are the so-called ‘traditional’/’subsistence’ and ‘modern’/’capitalist’ 
sectors.  The former is supposed to be characterized by surplus labour, 
unchanging production techniques and zero net savings.  In contrast, efficient 
labour utilization and high savings rates are believed to be the diagnostic 
features of the modern sector.  Within this basic schema growth is construed as 
a gradual shift from the ‘traditional subsistence’ sector to the ‘modern 
capitalist’ sector.  In the transitional period it is ascribed to the ‘subsistence’ 
sector the role of labour supplier and to the ‘capitalist’ sector the role of creator 
of employment opportunities through progressive capital investments, 
accumulation and introduction of advanced technologies (Mafeje 1978:48). 
 
The main problem with the ‘two economies’ thesis as used by government 
functionaries in contemporary South Africa is the same problem that trailed Arthur 
Lewis’s and other modernization theorists’ use of the concept, and it should be 
emphasized in this work that the so-called ‘two economies’ developed not 
autonomously, but through a relationship in which the ‘subsistence’/’traditional’ 
economy was forced by colonial and apartheid forces to function as a pool of cheap 
migrant labour for the ‘modern’ economy.   
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In other words, there are no ‘two economies’ but two branches of the same economy; 
the ‘second’ branch created by the first branch and used by that branch for its own 
advancement.  The ‘second’ branch has remained subsistent and underdeveloped 
mainly as a consequence of the logic of this relationship. Seen in this light, the notion, 
according to Mbeki (2003), that the ‘second’ economy contributes nothing to South 
Africa’s wealth is not exactly correct.  The country’s wealth is created by both the 
sophisticated formal sector and by millions of people in the second branch of the 
economy (farm workers, factory workers, domestic workers, mine workers, and rural 
women who raise the children of absentee fathers, etc.).  For the purposes of this 
research, the concept of ‘two economies’ serves to highlight the fact that the South 
African financial system was deliberately developed to exclude those who inhabit the 
‘second branch’ of the economy, a situation that has remained substantially 
unchanged since the end of apartheid in 1994.  The concept also serves to highlight 
the role that microcredit could play in job-creation and poverty reduction, alongside 
job-creation initiatives like the expanded public works (EPW) programme (Mbeki, 
2005).  
3.2.2 Microcredit and poverty reduction 
The South African microenterprise sector comprises microbusinesses and survivalist 
businesses.  The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, 1998) defines a 
microbusiness as one that employs less than five people and has a turnover of not 
more than R150,000.  This amount exempts such a business from value added tax 
(VAT) registration. Spaza shops, mini taxis, and home-based industries are examples 
of microbusinesses, and over 75% of these businesses are located in four provinces, 
namely Gauteng (34%), Kwa-Zulu Natal (18%), Western Cape (14%) and Eastern 
Cape (10%).  Together they account for about 6,8% of employment in the country 
(DTI, 1998). 
Survivalist businesses, on the other hand, are those businesses with no paid 
employees, often with revenues below the minimum income standard, and which 
operate at subsistence levels. Examples are hawkers, petty traders, and subsistence 
farmers.  Kwa-Zulu Natal, Gauteng, Eastern Cape and Limpopo provinces account for 
about 72% of survivalist businesses in the country.  It is estimated that these 
businesses contribute approximately 3,0% of employment in the country (DTI, 1998).  
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Clearly, the South African microenterprise sector is struggling.  In terms of both the 
quantity and quality of employment it creates, the sector does not at present play any 
significant role in poverty reduction. The general consensus among development 
experts (Shaw, 2004:1, Morduch and Haley, 2001) is that broad-based access to credit 
is one of the keys for lifting the microenterprise sector above subsistence levels.  
Muhammad Yunus (2004e) puts it bluntly: ‘if financial resources can be made 
available to the poor… on terms and conditions that are appropriate and reasonable, 
these millions of small people with their millions of small pursuits can add up to 
create the biggest development wonder’.  This assertion is supported by data from 
India, El Salvador, Vietnam and Bangladesh. 
In India, one NGO, Society for Helping to Awaken Rural Poor through Education 
(SHARE), has reported that about 50% of its clients have graduated out of poverty.  
In El Salvador, the weekly income of FINCA clients increased on average by 145%.  
In Vietnam, clients of a Save the Children partner organization reduced food deficits 
of their clients from three months to one month (CGAP, 2002).   In Bangladesh, 
Grameen Bank clients experienced changes in income, employment, and increases in 
assets - more than households without microenterprise credit access. There was also 
improvement in nutrition, wage increases and school enrollment of children in 
households that accessed Grameen Bank credit (World Bank, 1994). This echoes 
Wright’s (2000:14) assertion that apart from reducing poverty, microcredit improves 
the welfare of participating households and also enhances their capacity to sustain 
improvements in living conditions over time.  
In Bolivia, BancoSol has recorded significant successes in its microenterprise credit 
programs.  By 1992, it had reached more than 650,000 clients, whose quality of life 
has reportedly improved (Koenigsfest, 2001). In its 1997 report, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) also affirmed that microenterprises reduces poverty, 
empowers women, generates employment and leads to the growth of the 
microenterprise sector, which the Bank considers to be an end in itself.   
There are, however, contentions around the poverty reduction potentials of 
microenterprises. Some researchers believe that although there should be broad-based 
access to microcredit for productive purposes, the ‘very poor’ are not always reached 
because microcredit programmes are not always designed in such a way as to make 
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them accessible to the poor.  For Scully (2004:1) and Bates et al (1996), the idea that 
microcredit programmes help the poorest of the poor or that microenterprises reduce 
poverty is a myth. Their argument is that microloans are usually so small that they can 
generate no meaningful revenues. It has also been argued that despite the substantial 
microfinance penetration in Bangladesh, about 50% of the population are poor 
(Mcguire et al, 1998; SDC, 2004).  Annan (1998), therefore, suggests that 
microenterprise credit should be complemented with aggressive programmes aimed at 
promoting appropriate technology, markets and skills, and ADB (1997) cautions 
against promoting microenterprise credit at the expense of education, healthcare and 
sanitation – all of which are crucial for poverty-reduction. 
 
As one of its millennium development goals (MDGs), the United Nations seeks to 
halve poverty by 2015 (UNDP, 2004).  However, it is believed that without broad-
based access to savings and credit, it will be impossible for the poor to achieve the 
MDGs on their own terms (CGAP, 2002).  
That there is wide research support for microenterprise credit as an employment 
creation and poverty alleviation tool is not to underplay the importance of other needs 
of the poor, such as skills and improved links to buyers and suppliers of goods and 
services (Toomey, 1998). However, arguments that the poor lack motivation to 
successfully manage a business and, hence, should not be further burdened with loans 
(Adams and Von Pichke, 1992: 1468; Zeller and Sharmer, 2000; Scully, 2004: 1; 
Bates et al, 1996; Mcguire et al, 1998) should be viewed with caution, as they could 
be based on a faulty assumption that the poor cannot be productive no matter what. 
Such views ignore the fact that in many developing countries, the microenterprise 
sector – with its foundations laid on the economic pursuits of the so-called 
‘unproductive poor’ - actually serves as a safety net for people displaced or not 
adequately accommodated by the formal economy.   
In Nigeria, for example, research has shown that were it not for what some scholars 
call the ‘social cushion’ role of the vibrant microenterprise sector, the Nigerian 
economy would have collapsed in the face of decades of mismanagement, corrupt 
leadership, massive retrenchments, unemployment and poverty (Ukpong 1996: 140). 
However, the Nigerian microenterprise sector has remained vibrant in spite of the 
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absence of microcredit.  The argument, therefore, should not be whether the poor need 
microenterprise credit, or whether financial assistance would further stunt their ability 
to be productive.  Rather, the argument should be whether the statutory framework 
guiding microcredit operations is one that promotes broad-based microenterprise 
credit access and discourages opportunistic lending. 
Some points need to be made at this point concerning interest rate - or indeed, the cost 
of borrowed capital - as it is an issue that is frequently raised by some analysts who 
believe that microenterprise credit will further hurt the poor (see Adams and Von 
Pichke, 1992: 1468). The issue of interest rate is a concern not only to prospective 
borrowers, but also to people wishing to invest in interest-yielding banking products.  
The notion that microenterprise hurts the poor is hinged on the fact that if the cost of 
capital is high, expected returns on investment will be low (Rose, 2003:118), which 
then increases the probability of loan default. It is also a fact that microentrepreneurs, 
being poor, are sometimes desperate to obtain credit to start a business or expand an 
existing one, and, therefore, will accept unfavourable credit terms (Ledgerwood 
1999:138).  This eventually could lead to loan default, and could even plunge them 
into a debt trap.  Finally, because the poor lack collateral, the immediate recourse of 
lenders is to ‘price for the risk’ (Joffe, 2003a), which then arbitrarily raises the cost of 
borrowed funds.   
These concerns often lead to the debate that interest rates should be subsidized if 
microentrepreneurs and indeed the poor are to benefit from microcredit. Meyer and 
Nagarajan (1997:4) argue that interest rate subsidies will only favour the wealthy who 
already have access to other forms of credit. Adams and Von Pischke (1992:1465) 
share this opinion. They illustrate that experience in the 1950s and 1960s showed, 
especially in the formal financial markets, that subsidized interest rates only 
encouraged those with no financial difficulties to capture the loans. Others like 
Mohane et al (2002:4) believe that subsidizing interest rates can distort the market, 
limit growth and encourage dependency.  Therefore sustainable interest rates must be 
charged in order to cover all the necessary cost, while providing additional capital to 
support further credit demands.  
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The above concerns and debates only underscore the imperative of having a 
regulatory framework that recognizes the developmental potential of microenterprises 
and the need to direct the microcredit sector towards realizing that potential. 
3.3 Statutory Environment of Microcredit in South Africa 
Although microcredit has a long history, in its official form, it is one of the newest 
businesses in South Africa (Niekerk, 2002:2).  It could be traced to the 1992 Usury 
Act Exemption Notice, which exempted loans of less than R10,000 from its 
demanding provisions.  The aim was to open up the credit market to small borrowers 
(Mohane et al, 2002: 1).   In the last few years, the sector has experienced what 
Niekerk (2002: 2) calls ‘rapid expansion’, a phenomenon he attributes to ‘pent up 
demand’ from people hitherto excluded from mainstream credit services.  The reality, 
however, is that the ‘rapid expansion’ has not translated to broad-based expansion, 
because the ‘expansion’ has only occurred within the salary-earning segment of the 
population. The ‘pent-up demand’ has also occurred mainly within this segment.  In 
other words, the pent-up demand in the historically excluded segment of the 
population remains largely unaffected by the ‘expansion’. 
What further brought about ‘expansion’, as Niekerk (2002:2) acknowledges, was the 
fact that microlenders were allowed access to the government’s payroll system 
(Persal), which made it possible for borrowed funds to be deducted from borrowers’ 
salaries. With the guarantees of the Persal system, microlenders ‘grew’ their book 
rapidly and charged excessive interest rates, and in the process borrowers became 
over-indebted.  The ensuing crisis of reckless interest charges and over-indebtedness 
of civil servants made government, in 2000, to stop the use of the Persal system for 
loan recovery.  It should, however, be noted that government employees still form the 
bulk of the clientele of the microlenders (Niekerk 2002:2, Meagher and Wilkinson 
2001). 
That civil servants and other salaried individuals constitute the preferred clientele of 
microlenders is an indication that the South African microcredit sector has a strong 
consumption bias (see Section 3.4 below).  This bias has its roots in the 
statutory/regulatory framework guiding operations in the microcredit sector. 
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3.3.1 Microfinance Regulatory Council (MFRC) 
The Microfinance Regulatory Council (MFRC), established under the Usury Act 
Exemption Notice of June 1 1999, was one of the major steps towards streamlining 
the South African microlending sector, monitoring the activities of microlenders and 
protecting the interest of borrowers.  The Council is incorporated under Section 21 of 
the Companies Act and recognized as the official and single regulator of all money 
lending transactions that fall within the scope of the Usury Act Exemption Notice of 
June 1, 1999 (MFRC, 2004a).  All microlenders are required to register with the 
MFRC in order to be entitled to the exemptions of the Usury Act, such as freedom to 
determine their lending rates.  
The Usury Act Exemption Notice allows the Finance Minister to make regulations in 
respect of lending, credit, leasing transactions and interest rate charges on amounts 
below R10,000.  The new regulations compelled micro-lenders to belong to the 
MFRC, which is a self-funded ‘regulatory institution’.  MFRC would register and 
accredit microlenders, monitor and enforce compliance, handle complaints, educate 
the borrowing public, and provide the Minister with an annual report on its 
membership and activities (MFRC, 2004a). Exemption from the requirements of the 
Usury Act provisions is conditional on lenders adhering to the rules set by the MFRC.  
 
However, registered microlenders began to take advantage of their exemption from 
the provisions of the Usury Act by charging interest rates of more than ten times the 
prime lending rate on loan amounts under R10,000 (Ensor, 2003). An attempt by 
MFRC to cap the interest rate at ten times the prime lending rate met with resistance 
from the microlenders, as they considered it too low.  In 1999, they successfully 
challenged the MFRC in the high court, on the grounds that a low interest rate ceiling 
would drive them out of business (Ensor, 2003).  
 
What is not obvious from the above interest rate contestations is that by giving 
microlenders the freedom to decide what interest rates to charge on loan amounts 
below R10,000, the law inadvertently closes the door against people requiring credit 
for microenterprise purposes.  This is because microenterprise credit is interest rate-
sensitive, and a high interest rate regime ordinarily makes it difficult for businesses – 
especially microbusinesses - to break even.  Microlenders know this, as well as the 
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fact that a flexible interest rate regime, which best serves their purposes, makes sense 
only if credit is for short-term consumption.  This may be the hidden dynamic behind 
MFRC’s (1995) insistence that South Africa ‘accept the reality of consumption 
finance’. 
 
The exemption of loans of below R10,000 from Usury Act regulation and the 
inadvertent legitimisation of exorbitant interest rate charges raise an important 
question: who really is the Usury Act Exemption Notice protecting?  It becomes 
difficult to pinpoint the regulatory function of the Exemption Notice, especially when 
in everyday microcredit operations, some lenders charge a monthly interest rate of as 
high as 40% while others charge only 10% (see Chapter 5 of this work).  Joffe 
(2003b) has argued that with such a wide differential in the interest rates charged by 
lenders, the Usury Act Exemption Notice is of no use to the borrowers.  The 
regulation stifles innovation in the low-income credit market, and does not address the 
indebtedness problem of ‘unsophisticated borrowers’.  
 
MFRC moved to address the problems of reckless lending and over-indebtedness 
through the introduction, in 2001, of a National Loans Register (NLR), a database of 
people that utilise microcredit services (MFRC, 2004b).  The new ‘reckless lending 
rule’ mandated microlenders to refer to the NLR before granting loans, so that new 
loans would not be issued to already indebted persons.  It also put the responsibility 
on lenders to avoid situations that would lead to bad debts, as well as ensure that loan 
repayment instalments did not wipe out borrowers’ normal living expenses. 
 
However, as of 2004, only about sixty percent of the 1388 registered microlenders 
were on the National Loans Register (Experian, 2004), because some microlenders 
felt that disclosing information about their clients amounted to a breach of 
confidentiality.  Some microlenders even sued the MFRC for making the so-called 
‘reckless lending rules’ compulsory (Clayton, 2004).  This attitude may not be 
difficult to explain. Microlenders know only too well that disclosing information 
could drive their clients to competitors.  But some lenders could also be capitalising 
on the Usury Act Exemption to exploit borrowers, especially by issuing multiple 
loans - in so far as each loan is below R10,000 - and charging multiple administration 
and insurance fees. Such a practice becomes even easier if lenders could have the 
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loans linked to borrowers’ salary accounts such that repayment becomes a matter of 
having the relevant instalments deducted at source! 
 
The powerlessness  (Maposa, 2001) of the MFRC in enforcing its rules could be an 
indication that the Council is caught in its own contradictions.  By accepting what it 
calls the ‘reality of consumption finance’ and promoting it as the South African 
‘microfinance benchmark’ (MFRC 1995), the Council overlooks the fact that a 
microcredit model that is essentially focused on consumption (as opposed to 
production) will tend to encourage opportunistic and exploitative lending.  The reason 
is that being targeted at government and private sector employees and pensioners (that 
is, people who are considered ‘good credit risks’) consumption finance does not 
readily run into the conventional problems of adverse selection, and thus is relatively 
easy and cost-effective to administer.  Indeed, the present regulatory and operational 
environment of microcredit in South Africa is little more than an institutionalised 
system of emergency salary advance. 
 
3.4 Microcredit Practice in South Africa 
Although there is no universally accepted definition of the word ‘poor’, the term is 
used in this work to refer to low-income earners - whether employed, self-employed, 
or unemployed. Ordinarily, the credit needs of the poor include short-term 
consumption finance and micro enterprise credit.  Consumption finance comprises 
education-related loans, loans for the purchase of household assets, as well as credit 
meant for building renovation.   In many countries, microcredit has increasingly come 
to mean microenterprise credit as opposed to consumption credit.  What this means is 
that microfinance is increasingly defined as small loans for productive purposes.  
Consumption credit may satisfy an immediate need; however, in most cases, the 
economic condition of the beneficiary remains largely unchanged.  Some scholars, 
like Zeller and Meyer (2002:4), support the idea of consumption credit on the grounds 
that the poor need some form of consumption smoothening.  To these authors, it is 
only after consumption needs have been met, can microcredit be used productively. 
However, an acceptance of this view at the regulatory level could mean wasting the 
productive potential of microcredit.  Besides, only people with regular income 
streams (such as government workers, most of whom are unlikely to engage in 
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business) constitute the target market of consumption credit, and the poor can never 
hope to access it (Schreinder et al, 1995).   
3.4.1 Private Sector Microlenders 
In South Africa, consumption finance is the main product offering of registered 
private sector microlenders.  Lenders in this category include banks, private 
companies, close corporations, trusts and co-operatives.  According to Niekkerk 
(2002: 26-27), private sector microlenders avoid microenterprise credit for reasons 
associated with high transaction cost, high risk, low returns, low volumes of business, 
and lack of subsidy.  It is also believed that banks do not yet have the requisite 
‘specialized knowledge’ for dealing with recovery of small loans, and that the legal 
instruments to deal with defaults are not yet properly developed.  There are about 
1388 private sector microlenders with a total of 7232 branches in the country (MFRC, 
2004d).  These lenders control over 90% of the South African microcredit market 
(MFRC 2004d). 
Another category of private sector microlenders comprises lenders operating outside 
the direct regulatory control of MFRC, because they are not registered with the 
Council.   Unregistered private sector lenders include stockvels, pawnbrokers and 
township lenders.  Like their registered private sector counterparts, they do not offer 
microenterprise loans but focus on the (emergency) needs of people left out of the 
service of the registered microlenders.  Many unregistered microlenders, like those 
operating in the townships, have no fixed premises and no listed telephone or telefax 
numbers.  They do not observe fixed business hours and usually visit their clients at 
predetermined places and times.  Some can be found at factory gates, under trees, on 
shop floors, in office complexes, operating from cars, in farms and virtually 
everywhere. Indeed, many prefer not to be identified by any other persons than their 
clients (Du Plessis, 1998 in Niekerk, 2000:14). Pawnbrokers, who typically keep 
clients’ assets as security, operate retail networks, selling new and second-hand goods 
- often items confiscated from loan defaulters  (Niekerk, 2000:15).  
The clients of unregistered private microlenders include very low-income earners and 
the informally employed, who may or may not have bank accounts. Security is vital in 
this sector and this could range from personal belongings to identity documents and 
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pin codes.  (It should be noted here that MFRC prohibit its members from securing 
loans using these methods). Pawnbrokers, as earlier mentioned, sell defaulters’ 
pledged assets to recover costs, although transportation, storage and insurance costs 
often make this approach both burdensome and unprofitable.   Unregistered 
microlenders often resort to illegal measures to ensure loan repayment (Niekerk, 
2000:15). 
Despite the obvious risks of lending and borrowing in the unregistered microcredit 
market, the sector survives because, probably more than anything else, the 
microlenders are often part of the communities they serve.  As opposed to banks and 
other registered private sector microlenders (who may seem a bit formal and distant), 
the unregistered microlender appears to the average borrower as an everyday person 
willing to assume the risks that formal microlenders avoid.  It matters little to the 
potential borrower that interest rates in this field of alternative finance are sometimes 
substantially higher and the operations a lot more complicated.   
3.4.2 NGOs and MFIs 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-profit lenders collectively 
known as microfinance intermediaries (MFIs) also provide microcredit services in 
South Africa. Both groups are registered with MFRC as Section 21 companies.  
Indeed, NGOs and MFIs must be registered with MFRC for them to legally offer 
microcredit services.  Because of the pro-poor and ‘developmental’ nature of their 
activities, they are mostly located in the rural areas and in townships – that is, in close 
proximity to their target clientele. They typically provide loans for small business 
start-up and expansion, as well as credit for the construction of low-cost housing.  
There are about seventeen NGOs and MFIs (operating from fifty-four branches) in 
South Africa (MFRC, 2004d).  
South African non-profit microlenders source their funds from government and other 
domestic sources, as well as from foreign donors. As with most NGOs operating in 
other sectors, they are often constrained by the preferences and prescriptions of fund 
donors.  This hampers their effectiveness by rendering them inflexible and unable to 
respond to realities they encounter in the field.  This is in addition to the fact that the 
interventionist activities of most NGOs in developing countries are hobbled by lack of 
 28
funds, donor dependency, lack of expertise and low productivity.  The prevalence of 
bad debts in this sector, and the traditional view that the operations of NGOs are not 
sustainable, are to a large extent predicated on these constraints.  
According to Bauman (2003), the problem of skills shortage in the South African 
economy is even more severe in the non-profit microfinance sector.  Operators in this 
sector find it extremely difficult to attract qualified staff, let alone have the right 
incentives for people to work in the rural areas.  Bauman argues further that the South 
African educational system does not sufficiently cater for microfinance related skills 
because development courses in the universities are theoretical, general and geared 
toward urban issues such as trade unionism. The result is that most microfinance 
training in the country occurs on-the-job and staff poaching among competitors is 
rampant.  
But the constraints of funding and staffing only partially explain why NGOs and 
MFIs in South Africa do not adequately reach the poor and the poorest of the poor.  
Despite claims to the contrary, many non-profit lenders do not seek to reach the ‘very 
poor’ as a matter of policy (Bay Research and Consulting Services, 2003).  The 
problem of asymmetrical information casts the ‘very poor’ as bad credit risks.  Non-
profit lenders – even those claiming to be Grameen Bank replications (Maykuth, 
2003) - circumvent this problem by designing their lending methodologies in such a 
way as to select out this segment of the target market.  
3.4.3 Khula Enterprise Finance 
The direct involvement of government in microcredit in post-apartheid South Africa 
dates back to 1996, with the establishment of Khula Enterprise Finance Limited as an 
agency of the Department of Trade and Industry. The primary role of Khula 
Enterprise Finance was to facilitate access to credit for SMMEs through commercial 
banks, retail financial intermediaries (RFIs) and microcredit outlets (MCOs) (Khula 
Enterprise Finance Ltd, 2004a). It also provides mentorship to entrepreneurs in 
various aspects of business management.   
Of particular interest to this study is Khula Enterprise Finance’s involvement with 
MCOs and RFIs, which are the retail outlets that service the microenterprise sector. 
This involvement is formalized through the company’s microcredit scheme known as 
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KhulaStart.  In reality, many of the MCOs and RFIs are outlets created by existing 
NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) specifically to administer 
KhulaStart loans.  The reason for this is that a number of NGOs and CBOs - 
especially those already providing business training and advice to local SMMEs - 
already have established presence and links within the community and can easily, at 
least in theory, reach the categories of borrowers that the KhulaStart scheme targets. 
The KhulaStart scheme is based on the United Nations model of microcredit, which in 
turn is based on the Grameen Bank model.  Thus, it targets South Africa’s historically 
disadvantaged communities, particularly women in rural and semi-urban areas. At 
least 70% of KhulaStart loans are given to women (Enterprise Finance Ltd, 2004b).  
KhulaStart sets the lending policies that guide the operations of the MCOs and RFIs it 
works with. For example, the group lending methodology employed by the various 
retail outlets is policy of Khula Enterprise Finance, and it derives from the United 
Nations/Grameen Bank model mentioned above. 
A major weakness of the KhulaStart scheme is that the number of retail outlets the 
scheme utilizes is abysmally small.  As at 2004, only about 17 MCOs and 20 RFIs 
were in operation nationwide (Enterprise Finance Ltd, 2004b).  Because of the 
country’s history of segregation and exclusion, the microenterprise credit need of 
South Africa is huge, and requires extensive, even revolutionary, intervention if any 
visible impact on employment creation and poverty reduction is to be felt.  Also, as 
shown in Chapter Five, there is more to the inadequacies of the KhulaStart scheme 
than the mere fact of limited number of retail outlets.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The view that the South African microcredit industry has experienced ‘rapid 
expansion’ in the last few years may appear to be true when observing only the total 
value of loan disbursements (see Table 1). However, such statistics of ‘rapid 
expansion’ disguises the fact that over 95% of disbursements involves transactions 
that may well be described as institutionalised salary advance. The great majority of 
South Africa’s historically excluded continue to subsist on the margins of even the 
microcredit sector.  The reason for this is that the regulatory framework for 
microcredit operations in South Africa, being overwhelmingly biased towards 
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consumption, promotes a lending model that is anti-poor.  A contrasting approach to 
microcredit is the model adopted by Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, and this is 
examined in the next chapter.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GRAMEEN BANK 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As indicated in Chapter Two of this work, probably the most revolutionary thing 
about Grameen Bank vis-à-vis conventional banking practice is its assumption that 
people, even the poor, are good credit risks until proved otherwise. The main purpose 
of this chapter is to examine how this assumption drives the bank’s everyday 
microcredit operations, and in particular, how this underlying assumption is 
embedded in the bank’s organisational and lending features. More importantly, the 
chapter shows that a good understanding of a society’s social and cultural norms is 
indispensable if microcredit operators are to address the problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard, and at the same time broaden access to credit, especially for 
microenterprise purposes.   
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: section two offers a brief overview of 
the Banglasdeshi economy, while the third section traces the history of Grameen 
Bank.  In the fourth and fifth sections, the organisational and lending features of the 
bank are examined, while section six offers some insights into the ‘successes’ and 
‘shortcomings’ associated with these features.  Section seven examines the possibility, 
using the BancoSol experiment in Bolivia, of blending the developmental 
underpinnings of nonprofit microfinance with the commercial ethos of conventional 
banking to lay the foundation for a new microcredit paradigm.     
 
4.2 Economic Overview of Bangladesh 
Compared with South Africa, Bangladesh (literally: ‘land of the Bengalis’) is poor, 
overpopulated and ill-governed (Geography IQ, 2004).  At least 80% of the country's 
135 million people live in poverty, which makes it the poorest country in South Asia 
and one of the poorest in the world (World Bank, 2004b).  Its economy is largely 
agro-based, and agriculture employs about 74% of the country’s workforce.  Rice, of 
which Bangladesh is the world’s fourth largest producer, is the single most important 
agricultural product (UNCDF, 2004, Geography IQ, 2004).  Other crops, like jute, 
sugar cane, tobacco and wheat are also produced UNCDF, 2004; Geography IQ, 
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2004; Lye, 2000: 33).  The service sector, however, generates half of the country’s 
GDP. 
Besides economic mismanagement and poor institutions, Bangladesh’s poverty is 
largely blamed on its history.  Before independence on March 26, 1971, Bengali East 
Pakistan (the region that was to become known as Bangladesh) was a deeply 
marginalized region of Pakistan.  Three decades of domination and marginalization by 
West Pakistan led to economic stagnation and degradation in the Bengali region. By 
the end of the 1960s, widespread discontent and agitation in the region had reached a 
point where the Bengalis felt only an armed rebellion would lead to their liberation 
from the Western Pakistanis: 
In the fall of 1970, a powerful opposition movement emerged in East Pakistan. 
During the 1971 civil war, a number of factional paramilitary bands, which 
included communist forces dedicated to a rural-based revolution along Maoist 
lines, fought against each other and engaged in terrorism. The strongest of the 
new paramilitary bands, and the one that would have the greatest impact on 
future events, was organized under the Awami League's military committee 
headed by Colonel M.A.G. Osmany, a retired Pakistan Army officer. This 
band was raised as [Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s, or] Mujib's action arm and 
security force. As the political struggle between East Pakistan and West 
Pakistan intensified, the Awami League's military arm assumed the character 
of a conventional, albeit illegal, armed force (Heitzman and Worden, 1988). 
After independence, the country was saddled with the devastation caused by 
economic exploitation during the Pakistan era and the destruction of ‘critical 
infrastructure’ during the War of Liberation (Virtual Bangladesh, 2004).  Also, the 
1970 cyclone (the worst of its kind in the world, in which over one million people 
died), the 1974 famine, the devastating floods of 1988 and 1998, the Tsunami flood of 
December 2004, and periodic storms have become part of the country’s chronicle of 
natural and social disasters, contributing significantly to Bangladesh’s endemic 
problem of poverty (Lye, 2000: 32).   
There are, however, reports that poverty levels are declining in Bangladesh, especially 
among the poorest of the poor.  The declines are attributed to factors such as increased 
access to microcredit among farmers, and other intervention activities by the nonprofit 
sector.  Although many microcredit programmes have tended to encourage a shift 
from agricultural microenterprises to petty trading, microenterprise loans are mostly 
used for agricultural purposes (USAID, 2004). 
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It should be mentioned here that microfinance, as a specialized subfield of 
development economics is only about three decades old. According to Bell (1989: 1), 
although the post-World War II period aroused the interest of developed nations 
towards conditions of poverty, illiteracy, disease and mortality, in countries that were 
then considered ‘agrarian’, never was it then conceived that credit could be used as 
one of the tools to fight poverty.  Bangladesh is regarded as the first country where 
microcredit has been used as a poverty-reduction tool, although there have been 
disagreements as to its impact on the overall poverty levels in the country.     
4.3 History of Grameen Bank 
 
In 1976, Muhammad Yunus, then Professor and Head of Rural Economics at 
Chittagong University at Jobra, Bangladesh, started Grameen Bank as a research 
project.  His aim was to examine the possibility of designing a credit delivery system 
that would provide banking services to the poor (Yunus, 2004a).  The project began at 
Jobra and during 1976-1979, was extended to some of the neighbouring villages. One 
of the strongest propelling factors for the establishment of Grameen Bank was the 
1974 famine in Bangladesh in which hundreds of thousands of people died.  The level 
of human suffering has been recorded in a Television documentary: 
 
[I saw] skeleton-like bodies…  Young people looked very old; old people 
looked like kids.  And they were going from their… kitchens to find some food 
to eat so that they could survive for another day… So you wonder: ‘why don’t 
people have enough to eat?’  I [became] totally frustrated with the textbook 
economics that I was teaching my students, and the reality that I [saw] outside.  
But as an economist I [couldn’t] have anything to do, other than, as a human 
being, to make myself useful to other human beings (quoted in Discovery 
Channel, 2003).   
 
 
Given this reality, Muhammed Yunus embarked on a regular tour of the village in 
order to further familiarize himself with the reality of poverty at Jobra, and it was on 
one such occasion that he made a simple observation that was to become the 
foundation upon which Grameen (literally: ‘belonging to the villagers’) bank would 
be built: 
 
I was just going on the regular rounds that I did in the village, to meet people, 
to understand their problems, and [to see] if there’s anything I [could] do.  And 
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I stopped at this lady’s house; it was such a shabby little house…  I stopped 
because she was making bamboo stools… there were a few [completed] 
bamboo stools and she was weaving another one… It looked so beautiful…  
There was a big contrast, between what she was producing and where she 
lived…  The question came to my mind, why is she so poor; and she said she 
[made] only two pennies a day.  Then I couldn’t believe that anybody [could 
survive] on two pennies a day (quoted in Discovery Channel, 2003). 
 
Upon interrogation, he found that the woman produced her bamboo ware from small 
loans she obtained from a local moneylender, and that in addition to the exorbitant 
interests she paid for the loans, she was compelled to sell her ware to the moneylender 
at a price fixed by him.  Yunus saw this as a form of slave labour, and decided to 
ascertain how widespread such cases were at Jobra by sending a small team of student 
volunteers to investigate.  The feedback was shocking: besides the fact that there were 
several enterprising women engaged in ‘slave labour’ in the town, the amount they 
actually needed to run their small businesses was very small.  For example, the total 
loan required by the 42 women the volunteers interviewed came to an equivalent of 
$27.  Yunus loaned out this amount from his pocket.  His personal credo, ‘where you 
see a poor person, I see an entrepreneur’ (Discovery Channel, 2003) appeared to be 
confirmed by these observations. 
 
In a bid to ensure a sustainable stream of financial assistance, Yunus contacted a local 
bank branch to convince the manager to grant loans to the local women.  This is 
where he made his most significant discovery, one that would require designing a 
bank that would run on a different set of principles: 
 
I went to a bank branch located on the campus, talked to the manager, and 
when I proposed that he should give money to these poor people in the village, 
he almost fell from the sky.  [He said] ‘but they are not credit worthy!’ I said, 
‘how do you know they’re not credit worthy?’  [He said] ‘because they are 
poor’.  I said, ‘have you ever given them any money before?’ [He said] ‘no!’  
‘Why didn’t you?’  [He said] ‘they’re not credit worthy!’  When I told him I 
had loaned my money out to the women, the bank manager said: ‘that is the 
last time you’re seeing your money because none of them will come back’ 
(quoted in Discovery Channel, 2003). 
 
 
As stated in Chapter Two of this work, conventional banks take the problem of 
information asymmetry literally: the poor are a special case of adverse selection 
and moral hazard.  The poor, in other words, are bad credit risks, and conventional 
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credit risk management systems do not recognize them even as a potential market. 
Yunus’s idea, on the other hand, is that the poor merely lack the means with which 
to create wealth.  If they are provided with the means, they will create the world of 
their dreams (Jacques Attali, quoted in Discovery Channel, 2003). Conventional 
banking does not probe into potentials.  For Yunus, the poor are good credit risks. 
 
Eventually, in 1976, the ‘sustainable’ financial assistance that Yunus sought came not 
from any commercial bank, but from Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB), which is the 
government’s agricultural bank.  Initially, Yunus obtained permission to run a local 
branch of Krishi Bank based on criteria derived from his field research at Jobra and 
on his personal convictions about the potentials and credit-worthiness of the poor.  
The Central Bank of Bangladesh and some commercial banks later supported the 
project and this facilitated the extension of the project, in 1979, to Tangail (north of 
the capital city of Dhaka) (Yunus, 2004a).  With the success in Tangail, the project 
later extended to several other districts in the country.  In October 1983, what began 
as Grameen Bank Project transformed into an independent bank through government 
legislation.  Borrowers own 90% of the bank’s shares, while government owns the 
remaining 10% (Grameen Bank, 2004a). 
Grameen Bank has undergone three main transitions since inception; that is, from 
being a project of BKB in 1976, to being a statutory, independent bank in 1983.  In 
2000, a major operational change again occurred that led to what is now popularly 
known as Grameen Bank II. The change was linked to the so-called ‘flood of the 
century’, which devastated almost two-thirds of Bangladesh in 1998.  
Like other villagers, poor people had been severely affected by the flood, and 
Grameen Bank clients even more so (Yunus, 2002).  Crops, livestock and homes were 
wiped out in the floods and many people earned no income for several months (BBC 
News, 1998).  Up to 50% of borrowers fell behind on their weekly repayments.  
Grameen Bank decided to intervene by giving borrowers new loans with which to 
start their businesses all over again and to generate income to repay both the new 
loans and whatever had been outstanding on initial loans.  The new loans were also 
meant to help with the repair or rebuilding of houses destroyed by the flood.  In order 
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to finance these new loans, Yunus obtained additional funds from the Central Bank of 
Bangladesh (BBC News, 1998).  
But multiple loans introduced their own complications. Borrowers found that the new 
installments exceeded their capacity to repay, and so many women started to stay 
away from weekly centre (repayment) meetings (Yunus, 2002). To worsen matters, 
their husbands teamed up with local politicians to protest against the so-called ‘group 
tax’ component of the ‘group fund’ (See Section 4.5.9 below). 
Faced with these problems, Yunus fell back on his understanding of local social and 
cultural norms in rural Bangladesh and decided to redesign Grameen Bank’s 
conventional lending methodology - known as Grameen Classic System (GCS) - in 
order to allow some flexibility in loan terms (Yunus, 2002).  This was done in 2001, 
and after a period of field-testing, a new Grameen Generalized System (GGS), or 
Grameen Bank II, was adopted.  Yunus (2002) remarks as follows about the change 
from Grameen Bank I to Grameen Bank II: 
In the Grameen Bank II, gone are the general loans, seasonal loans, family 
loans, and more than a dozen other types of loans; gone is the group fund; gone 
is the branch-wise, zone-wise loan ceiling; gone is the fixed size weekly 
installment; gone is the rule to borrow every time for one whole year, even 
when the borrower needed the loan only for three months; gone is the high-
level tension among the staff and the borrowers trying to steer away from a 
dreadful event of a borrower turning into a "defaulter", even when she is still 
repaying; and gone are many other familiar features of Grameen Classic 
System. 
As opposed to the old system, GGS would offer basic loan, housing loan and higher 
education loan.  Note that these loans are not consumption loans, in the conventional 
use of this term, but rather are part of a comprehensive development package. In 
development terms, these loans are given based on the understanding that a poor 
person who has received microenterprise (productive) loan, should not have to sleep 
under a tree or under a bridge after a hard day’s work.  Also his or her children should 
not grow up to be targets of microcredit. 
Other features of the GGS include flexible loans, flexible loan terms, savings 
programme, loan insurance, provision for destitute members, and absence of loan 
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ceiling. According to Yunus (2002), the adoption of GGS marked a new era for the 
Bank.  By 2004, the 1998 flood loans had been paid off (Yunus, 2004a). 
4.4 Organisational Features of Grameen Bank 
Grameen Bank operates through an organizational pyramid in which field workers 
form the base, and the head office is the peak.  Occupying the intervening segments, 
from the field workers, are bank branches, area offices, and zonal offices.  The bank’s 
borrowers, on the other hand, are organized in groups of five, and six such groups 
make up a centre (Jain, 1996: 82).  Each group has a chairperson, a secretary, and a 
centre chief.  Group members obtain loans on a sequential basis: loans are given first 
to two members of a group; the next two are eligible only after one month of regular 
loan repayment and savings deposit by the initial borrowers, and so on (Jain, 1996: 
82).   
Each field worker – sometimes called a ‘foot soldier’ - oversees ten centres. In a 
given week, he attends two different centre meetings daily. and ensures that the 
admission of new members into an existing group or the formation of a new group 
meets the bank’s eligibility criteria.  He takes new group members through a seven-
day training programme to familiarize them with the bank’s rules and norms.  He also 
assesses the suitability of loan requests and business proposals (Jain, 1996: 84). 
A bank branch is the main operating unit, made up of a manager, an accountant, about 
seven workers, and two to three trainees ( Jain, 1996: 83).  A branch serves about 120 
to 150 centres.  The branch manager monitors the activities of the fieldworkers by 
visiting the centres from time to time.  If he is dissatisfied with the composition of a 
group or the quality of training given by a field worker, he may change the group 
composition and/or provide additional training to borrowers. 
Ten to fifteen branches are grouped under an area office, which is headed by an area 
manager. The area manager supervises the branches with the assistance of a 
programme officer.  Through attending branch review meetings, they are 
knowledgeable about the performance of the centres and that of branch staff.  They 
also make impromptu visits to the various groups and centres (Jain, 1996: 84). 
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The zonal offices oversee 10 to 15 area offices, and are responsible for field 
organization and ‘performance appraisal’.  They recommend staff promotions and 
make other administrative decisions.  The zonal office hosts an ombudsman, who is 
appointed by the Managing Director to investigate complaints against bank staff 
before any internal disciplinary action is taken (Jain, 1996: 85).  The Bank’s head 
office provides all resources like manpower, money, physical items and other 
requirements to the field offices (Jain, 1996:86).  
Besides what is often referred to as Grameen Bank’s ‘strategic credit policies’ Jain 
(1996: 88), some researchers have found the bank’s good organizational culture and 
operational practices to be important contributory factors in the bank’s successful 
performance. Indeed, for Chaves and Conzalez-Vega, (1996:77) organizational 
thoroughness is a stronger factor in the bank’s success, because no matter how well 
designed a financial policy is, if an organization does not have the mechanism and 
discipline to implement it properly, such a policy is bound to fail. 
 
Grameen Bank trains its staff almost to the point of indoctrination, and staff behaviour 
betrays little conflict of interests.  Loan decisions are made openly in the presence of 
borrowers, and corruption is virtually absent among bank workers.  It may even be 
said that bank staff seek every opportunity of transferring their convictions to clients.  
Transparency and honesty in bank-client dealings thus place a moral obligation on 
borrowers to reciprocate by not defaulting in their loan repayments (Jain, 1996:81).   
 
Staff salaries and other benefits at Grameen Bank match those of Bangladeshi 
commercial banks - obviously in line with the belief that incentives induce self-
regulation among employees and motivate them to comply with organization’s norms.  
Though performance is the basic criterion for staff promotion, Grameen Bank has 
been found to have a rapid promotion policy: staff are promoted every 3 to 4 years.  
Arguably an indication that the Bangladeshi financial sector attaches great importance 
to the high-level staff training and the ethos of honesty, transparency and commitment 
at Grameen Bank, the bank reportedly loses about 50-60% of staff to the competition 
shortly after their initial six-month intensive training (Jain, 1996: 87). 
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Finally, Hashemi and Schuler (1997) attribute Grameen Bank’s success and global 
appeal to the bank’s organizational ethos and humane corporate personality.  Grameen 
Bank, they maintain, has a clear:  
 
basic concept and guiding vision, strong institutional identity, charismatic and 
conscientious leadership, disciplined organizational style, highly motivated, 
socially-cohesive target group, and flexibility based on a faith in human nature 
and a non antagonistic approach to opponents’ among others. 
 
 
4.5 Grameen Bank’s Microlending Features 
As stated earlier, Grameen Bank operates a microcredit model that has been replicated 
worldwide, and which has evolved over many years.  The following are the main 
features of this model: 
4.5.1 Lending to the poor 
According to Yunus, Grameen Bank is built on the philosophy of ‘total trust in human 
capability’: ‘irrespective of who or where [a person] is, what kind of social 
background or family background he or she comes from, everyone has enormous 
potential inside.  If you let this come out, the world will be different’ (quoted in 
Discovery Channel, 2003).  In line with this philosophy, the bank targets the poorest 
of the poor; that is, ‘the bottom 50% of those whose income is below the poverty line’ 
(Mathie, 2001).  The bank does this by setting strict eligibility criteria to guide client 
selection, and adopts practical measures to screen out those who do not meet the 
criteria. Often, those that do not meet the criteria are the ‘not so poor’. 
Grameen Bank further qualifies the ‘poorest of the poor’ as those who have less than 
half an acre of land (Develtere and Huybrechts, 2002: 16). Grameencredit, as the 
bank’s loan is called, is based on the premise that the poor have skills that remain 
‘unutilized or under-utilized’ (Yunus, 2004b), and the assumption that it is societal 
institutions and policies that create poverty.  Therefore, rather than regard the poor as 
perpetual objects of charity, or condemn them to a state of permanent dependency, 
their skills, energy and creativity should be challenged.  This, the Bank believes, is the 
practical step out of poverty. There is support for this view in the literature.  For 
instance, Morduch and Haley (2002) have argued that ‘there is no proof of either an 
inverse relationship between a client’s level of poverty and their entrepreneurial skills, 
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or minor inclination to save among the poorest’.  Justifying poverty targeting on the 
grounds of equity, Mathie (2001) argues that it was morally imperative to help the 
poor to restore their dignity, especially if they have been exploited, impoverished or 
marginalized. He also argues that no meaningful economic development can occur in 
a society if poverty is not reduced through programmes designed specifically for that 
purpose.  
After granting a loan, Grameen Bank requires that borrowers use the money on a 
business in which they already have an existing skill, and particularly on very basic 
income generating activities that will bring immediate returns. 
Pro-poor lending strategies have, however, been criticized on the grounds that they do 
not adequately reach the poorest of the poor, and that loans meant for this target 
population often end up in the ‘wrong’ hands (Mathie, 2001).  Develtere and 
Huybrechts (2002) has, for instance, suggested that about 15 to 30% of Grameen 
Bank members do not belong to the target group. One explanation why the targets are 
often missed is that sometimes the ‘hard-core poor self-select’ themselves out of 
Grameen Bank schemes because ‘they are so destitute that they consider themselves 
not credit worthy’.  This category of potential borrowers typically fears debt burdens.  
Similarly, Evans et al (1999:420) concluded from their study of Grameen Bank that 
programme-related problems (such as insufficient supply of microcredit), client 
related barriers (such as bad health), and household preferences also make it 
impossible for microcredit to reach the very poor.   
During Grameen Bank’s early years, the concept of lending to the poor was fiercely 
opposed by many interest groups.  The Bangladeshi ‘left’ felt that the loans were baits 
by capitalists to make the poor abandon the prospect of a revolution, which, according 
to them, was what the country urgently needed.  Small amounts of money, they 
argued, would cool the zeal of the poor and make them difficult to mobilize.  On the 
other hand, Grameen Bank supporters held the paradoxical view that the bank was 
using its small loans to organize the poor to eventually overthrow capitalism. Money 
lenders, on their part, reportedly intimidated the women by suggesting that they would 
be forfeiting their right to befitting religious burials should they continue to borrow 
money from Grameen Bank (CBC-IDEAS, 1991). 
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Despite these conceptual and ideological challenges, Grameen Bank seems to have 
remained undeterred in its conviction that the poor are good credit risks, and has 
continued to make this segment of the Bangladeshi population the focus of its lending 
operations. 
4.5.2 Gender preference 
 
Grameen Bank initially sought to establish a 50-50 ratio of women and men 
borrowers (GDRC, 2004), but soon found that women occupied a special position in 
the household economy.  For instance, women’s economic status affects the health, 
nutrition, and the general state of the household more than that of men. Women were 
more dedicated to loan repayment than men, and therefore, were better credit risks 
(Goetz and Gupta, 1996:45). As Yunus puts it, women tend to be better managers of 
resources than men: 
 
Women had a longer vision.  They want to build up something.  Women 
benefiting from money always pass it on to their children, so children become 
immediate beneficiaries.  Women are very conscious about the money they 
have, [and are] … very careful managers of the little resources they have.  So 
[a woman] has bigger mileage from the money that she has compared to men 
(quoted in Discovery Channel 2003). 
 
The bank found that men were more likely to spend their income on their personal 
consumption needs even before spending on their family (GDRC, 2004). Because of 
these reasons, the bank gave greater priority to women in their microlending 
operations.    Another important reason for giving priority to women was that the 
decision was more in line with the Grameen Bank’s policy of lending to the poorest 
first, and women represent the most marginalized group among the poorest of the 
poor. This was even more appropriate in Bangladesh, where there is a high incidence 
of wife and children abandonment as a result of overdependence on men’s incomes 
(GDRC, 2004). Between 1980 and 1983, 39% of Grameen Bank loans were given to 
women and by 1992 women received about 93.3% of total loan disbursements (Goetz 
and Gupta, 1996:46). 
 
Several studies have established a positive relationship between microcredit extension 
to women and women economic empowerment (Pitt et al, 2003:30; Develtre and 
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Huybrechts, 2002:31; Schreiner, 1999:3).  This is in the form of improvement in 
income, self-employment, greater access to financial and economic resources, greater 
role in household decision-making, greater social networks and greater bargaining 
power.  
However, research has also shown that lending to women has unintended 
consequences.  In a study conducted in 1994, Rahman (cited in Pepall, 1998), found 
that far from being empowered, Grameen women borrowers were being exploited as a 
link to capital.  Rahman’s women respondents admitted that their men forced them to 
join the bank simply to acquire funds for their own use, and that they were constantly 
threatened with divorce if they refused to obtain loans. Women who refused to hand 
over borrowed funds for their men’s use were physically and verbally abused.  
Overall, the study found that 60% of loans taken out by women were used up by men, 
and up to 78% of the loans were used for purposes not approved by the bank.  The 
loans introduced tensions to the family fabric, especially as women now frequently 
kept late at loan-related meetings, returned from such meetings with loan amounts 
below their men’s expectations, and had to put pressure on their men to keep their 
hands off borrowed funds (Pepall, 1998).  There were also cases where ‘recalcitrant’ 
women had their livestock confiscated and sold by the men.  On the basis of these 
findings, Rahman questioned the long-term sustainability of women-targeted 
microlending programmes. 
Such reservations might justify the view that women should not be hastily drawn into 
the vortex of the credit economy, as that might actually worsen their suffering as an 
exploited gender.  Suggestions have been made that socio-economic improvement 
programmes for women should be holistic.  Even so, society should accept that 
‘improvements in women’s productivity, mobility, social status, gender privilege and 
class acceptance take time and require patience and a willingness to cope with the 
consequences of challenging entrenched social norms’ (Goetz and Gupta, 1996: 61).    
Most other observers and researchers that are interested in women targeted 
microcredit programmes have voiced these concerns.  It seems therefore that if 
microcredit is to benefit women, who are the world’s poorest, microcredit 
programmes should not target them in isolation.  Economic empowerment 
programmes must acknowledge the fact that the dominant form of social relations in 
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most societies is patriarchy.  For women economic empowerment to succeed and be 
sustainable, microcredit programmes, in particular, must be designed in such a way as 
not to deny men fair access to credit.  
The contestation around women, credit and economic empowerment is, indeed, a 
protracted one.  However, for Grameen Bank, women – especially poor women - are 
good credit risks, and this seems to have been confirmed by the bank’s 99% loan 
recovery rate from this category of borrowers. The bank seems committed to its 
founder’s thinking that women are disproportionately disadvantaged, and, therefore, 
deserve priority attention in the bank’s lending programmes.  As Yunus has remarked: 
‘when you ask, “who is a poor person?” I say “a woman – an entrepreneur woman”’ 
(quoted in Discovery, 2003). 
4.5.3 Collateral requirements 
When Grameen Bank claims to have ‘revolutionized’ banking, easily the most 
significant aspect of that ‘revolution’ is granting loans without demanding collateral.  
Whereas conventional lending is collateral-based, Grameen Bank clients are required 
to present nothing but a genuine intent to obtain a loan, which then necessitates their 
joining a group.  But to ensure the sustainability of the scheme, the bank must find an 
alternative, even more effective strategy to ensure prompt loan repayment.  This is 
where the bank utilizes its intimate knowledge of the socio-cultural norms of rural 
Bangladesh and turns to its founder’s philosophy of ‘total trust in human capability’.  
Some writers have referred to one of these norms as ‘peer pressure’.  According to 
Besley and Coate (1995:16), peer pressure works in much the same way as collateral 
because group members act as one another’s watchdog, such that loan default 
becomes difficult, if not impossible. 
But it can be argued that while peer pressure is a factor in eliciting group members’ 
commitment to loan terms, it is not a sufficient explanation for conformity.  Peer 
pressure builds on an already existing deep sense of community.  It is the creative 
mobilization of this sense of community in Bangladeshi villages, rather than the mere 
fact of ‘peer pressure’, that is the unique innovation that Grameen Bank has brought 
to the field of finance.   
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4.5.4 Group lending  
To constitute a pressure that substitutes for collateral, Grameen Bank adopts a group 
lending methodology.  It lends to women as groups and not as individuals. It is 
expected of group members to monitor and support one another so that their group 
does not default in repayments and be seen as ‘ailing’. Peer monitoring and support 
help individual members to stay committed to loan terms – and to the business 
objectives of the loan (Discovery Channel, 2003); collective responsibility serves as 
collateral. These strategies have contributed to Grameen Bank’s 99% loan recovery 
rate (Grameen Bank, 2004b), a feat that can hardly be achieved through collateral-
based lending.   
There have been suggestions that group lending is only effective in communities 
where people live in close physical proximity to one another.  A study conducted in 
Arkansas (U.S.A.) by Mondal and Tune (cited in van Balstelaer, 2000:10) found that 
closeness among potential clients facilitates the formation of borrower groups because 
knowledge of credit worthiness is readily available. The study also found that 
physical proximity makes it easier to hold regular group meetings.  Van Bastelaer 
(2000:10) has also pointed out that without such proximity, information on credit 
worthiness of prospective members, peer monitoring, and regular group meetings may 
become difficult.     
However, the above arguments could be contested on the grounds of their narrow 
understanding of human social ties; that is, their simplistic attribution of social ties to 
geography.  Although Grameen Bank’s borrower groups are based in specific villages 
and communities, the operations of the bank appear to be based more on what might 
be termed social and cultural proximity – rather than merely on ‘physical proximity’.  
If physical proximity alone were to suffice for group formation and microfinance 
success, then such success would be automatic in the world’s congested ghettos, such 
as Harlem in New York (U.S.A.), Soweto in Johannesburg (South Africa) and 
Ajegunle in Lagos (Nigeria).  Yet, there is probably no better place to observe 
anonymity and social distance than in ghettoes, slums and other crowded urban 
formations.  As mentioned in Section 4.5.3 above, Grameen Bank operations are built 
on its profound knowledge of the deep sense of community in rural Bangladesh. There 
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is in every society a sense of community that can be tapped into for successful pro-
poor microlending operations.   
There is research support for the assertion that group lending plays a strong role in 
loan repayment rate.  Group lending provides incentives for members to avoid 
excessively risky projects, and exposes members to ‘social sanction’ by the group 
(Besley and Coate 1995:16).  It makes it possible for members to support one another, 
thus serving as a form of social insurance (Varian, 1990; Coleman, 1998), and helps 
to reduce monitoring and other transaction costs (Coleman and Brett, 1999:107). Self-
group formation means that members self-select themselves into good credit risks, 
thus saving lenders the cost of obtaining information, screening loan applicants, 
auditing, and enforcement of contract terms (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999: 206; 
Tassel, 1999: 25). Especially in relation to loan-related meetings, group lending 
reduces the costs that would have been incurred if individual borrowers were to be 
visited weekly by bank staff (Conlin, 1999:267). 
Group lending may throw up certain problems. It could encourage free rider problems 
in monitoring and auditing (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999:217) as members may use 
information on their peers to one another’s disadvantage.  Although this might not be 
prominent in a rural, household-based economy (because competition might not be so 
stiff among rural microentrepreneurs) it is a weakness of group lending nonetheless. If 
social ties are weak, group solidarity may also be weak and enforcement of repayment 
may not be achieved (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999:220).  Therefore, the effectiveness 
of group lending as a factor in prompt loan repayment presupposes the existence of 
strong social ties. 
4.5.5 Loan purpose 
The term microcredit is used in a wide variety of contexts – ‘from agricultural credit 
to rural credit, cooperative credit, consumption credit, credit from… savings and loan 
associations, [credit from] credit unions, [and] credit from money lenders’ (Yunus 
2004b).  To some, it is credit for short-term consumption needs; to others it is loan for 
small business start-up or expansion.  Grameencredit is, by definition, credit for 
income-generating activities, as well as for housing for the poor.  It is credit for self-
employment, rather than for consumption.  Grameen Bank’s microcredit is often used 
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for the purchase of small plots of land for cultivation, paddy husking and lime-
making.  Manufacturing and processing activities are also targeted, such as pottery, 
weaving and garment sewing.  Other end uses include commercial activities like 
storage, marketing and transport services (Grameen Bank, 2004b). 
There also appears to be a deliberate effort by the bank to respond to concerns around 
what Zeller (1999:16) calls ‘consumption smoothening’.  One such concern is a 
situation whereby borrowers divert microenterprise credit to meet emergency or 
consumption-related needs because they have no other way of meeting such needs.  
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 1997), the diversion of 
microenterprise credit is one of the main challenges to the sustainability of the 
microenterprise sector. 
 
Grameen Bank has savings facilities to take care of borrowers’ emergency and 
consumption needs.  Under the new Grameen Generalised System, an amount 
equivalent to five per cent of a loan amount is deducted at the point of disbursement 
as obligatory savings.  Half of this five percent goes to the borrower’s personal 
savings accounts; the remaining half goes to a special savings account (Yunus, 2002). 
No withdrawal is permitted on the special savings account for the first three years, but 
borrowers have unrestricted access to their personal savings account. Thus, a 
personal savings account helps borrowers to meet urgent consumption and emergency 
demands. 
4.5.6 Repayment method 
 
Repayments are due one week after loans have been granted, and the compulsory 
savings referred to above commence simultaneously with the first loan repayment.  
While the size of weekly installments is generally small, borrowers have the option of 
varying it to reflect their actual ability to pay or to reflect the actual performance of 
their business.  For example, a borrower can decide to pay a larger installment during 
peak business season, and scale it down during off-peak periods  (Yunus, 2002). 
According to Jain and Mansuri (2003), besides helping to instill ‘fiscal discipline’ in 
borrowers, regularly scheduled repayments help the bank to mitigate the problems of 
information asymmetry, such as moral hazard. More importantly, it makes it 
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imperative for borrowers to be clear about the viability of their intended business 
before investing loan funds, since a loan is granted based on the understanding that 
the business will yield enough returns to make repayment possible within the shortest 
possible time.     
Grameen Bank’s weekly loan repayment method has been criticized as imposing 
undue burden on borrowers.  To start with, few microenterprises can generate enough 
revenues to make repayment possible within one week of investing loan funds.  To 
meet with the tight repayment plan, therefore, borrowers might be compelled to 
borrow from informal moneylenders to be able to repay Grameen Bank loan, which 
then exposes them to a cycle of debt. On the other hand, borrowers may be forced to 
retain part of the loan for use in loan repayments instead of investing the whole loan 
amount in the business. This makes the entire loan transaction counterproductive.  
According to Wright (1999:5), clients of MFIs in Bangladesh make their weekly loan 
repayments not from income arising from the loans, but, in some cases, from 
household savings: borrowers have no ‘grace period’ by which loan investment could 
generate income to fund repayment.   
 4.5.7 Loan size 
 
Usually, very small loans of between 2000-3000 Bangladesh Taka (approximately 
US$32-48 in February 2005) are given (Jain (1999:82). This is because weekly 
installments for a larger loan size may be burdensome and may not be sustained by 
most borrowers (Jain (1999:82).  Another important reason is that Grameencredit is 
targeted at the very poor.   
 
According to Mathie (2001), very small loan size discourages the not-so-poor from 
seeking Grameen Bank loans.  Besides the fact that small loans might be meaningless 
from a business point of view, few well-to-do people would like to subject themselves 
to the conditions attached to the loans: weekly group meetings, peer monitoring, 
recitation of the Bank’s Sixteen Decisions creed, and extreme time commitments!   
Coleman and Brett (1999:110) maintain that small loans, the many conditions 
attached to them, and the stigma of belonging to a poor people’s programme are 
sufficient to make the not-so-poor exclude themselves from Grameencredit.   
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It may, however, be argued that only the not-so-poor who have access to alternative 
sources of credit would exclude themselves from microcredit programmes.  In the 
absence of such alternatives, they probably will be prepared to tolerate small loans 
and frequent meetings in the hope of eventually graduating to bigger loans in 
subsequent loan cycles (see Mathie, 2001)  
One long-standing criticism of small loan policies – whether of Grameen Bank or any 
other MFI - is that the loan amount may not be sufficient to finance a business that 
would bring meaningful returns, and, thus, only serves the purpose of condemning the 
poor to perpetual poverty. 
 4.5.8 Client selection 
Conventional banking is predicated on the thinking that people who need banking 
services will eventually seek out a bank.  Therefore, even when banks invest in 
advertising and other marketing activities, they do so primarily to encourage potential 
clients to approach them.  Even so, it is mainly people who have access to the various 
advertising and marketing media (such as television, billboards, newspapers, radio, 
flyers) that encounter the banks’ messages. On the contrary, Grameen Bank operates 
on the principle that banks should go to people, and not vice versa, and that it is only 
through such an approach that the poor can be brought into the mainstream of 
financial services (Yunus, 2004b).  The idea of taking banking to the people would 
seem to harmonize with Grameen Bank’s policy of making credit available to the 
poorest of the poor – especially those in rural areas.    
Rubinstein (1997) gives a detailed description of the bank’s unique and intricate 
method of client-selection and group formation, and shows, above all, the extent to 
which Grameen Bank staff would go to convince the poor that they can do something 
for themselves.  His article, ‘Microcredit – A Poverty Eradication Strategy that 
Works’, is quoted here at some length: 
When the first Grameen Bank workers come to the village, they announce that 
they are looking for poor women to lend to. Usually, several women will come 
and say ‘I am poor and I could use a loan.’ The bank workers listen politely, 
but they take no action. Usually these women go away after awhile, when it 
seems that nothing is happening. After a few weeks, a bank worker starts 
looking for the first borrowers. She looks for the women who were too timid to 
come forward. She finds a woman in her hut, and says that the Grameen Bank 
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is looking for poor women to lend to. The woman usually responds that they 
must have meant to speak with her husband. ‘No, we meant to speak with 
you,’ the bank worker replies. The woman then often says that she doesn't need 
or want any money. Coming from a desperately poor woman, this is a strong 
sign that the bank has found a borrower. Almost everything in her life that 
started out looking like good news has turned out bad, and she's learned from 
bitter experience to avoid becoming hopeful.  
The bank worker explains that many other women as poor as she have taken 
loans, started small businesses, and generated income to repay the loans and 
improve the quality of their lives. The prospective borrower finds the courage 
to seek out four others. They each decide what to do with the money, and learn 
the rules of the Grameen Bank. The Grameen Bank approves the loans. Soon 
comes the day that she will receive the money. The night before she gets her 
loan, she cannot sleep. She worries that her business will not succeed and she 
will not be able to repay. By morning, she has often decided to cancel her loan 
request. But the other four women encourage her to go through with it, and 
convince her that with their support, she will succeed. When she accepts the 
money, her hands are trembling. She's never seen $30 all in one place, let alone 
in her own hands. She takes the money and starts her business, and her life is 
changed forever. 
This selection process defies all known loan selection and marketing techniques. In 
formal credit markets, banks and other credit institutions target wealthy clients not 
only because of their ability to repay but because they can offer the needed quantity 
and quality of collateral that is needed to secure the loan.  In the event of default, 
there is an asset to dispose of to recoup part, if not the entire loan.  Often during the 
process of loan screening, perceived bad credit risks (typically the unemployed, 
people below a certain income level, people living in certain residential areas, those 
with little or no business experience and illiterates) risk being dropped in the initial 
elimination process. This is because, according to popular belief, failed 
microenterprises are often those run by poor people (Wright, 2000:10). 
Grameen Bank demonstrates through its client selection and group formation methods 
that, given the right encouragement and motivation, the poor can engage successfully 
in productive activities, and that the poor have integrity to protect, especially in credit 
transactions. The bank demands no tangible assets as collateral, but places a demand 
on the poor’s most important asset – his or her integrity – and empowers its staff to 
speak to the poor’s social conditions. According to Yunus (2004d), while the rich may 
escape the consequences of loan default, the poor value access to credit, and would 
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keep to loan terms because this is the only opportunity they have to improve 
themselves: 
 
Even when they default, they never say, ‘Forget it’, or ‘who cares’. They 
always say: ‘We are sorry we could not pay back, we’ll like to do that as soon 
as we can’ and given the opportunity, they always do that with a sense of 
remorse. 
 
 4.5.9 Savings programmes 
Between 1976 and 1998 – the so-called Grameen Bank I era – each Grameen Bank 
client group maintained what was called group fund.  The fund was a form of 
compulsory savings by members.  Group funds were normally used not only to 
finance personal consumption needs and other economic activities, but also to assist 
clients to start new businesses in the event of business failure.  Also, about 50-60% of 
these funds were loaned to members while the balance was deposited with Grameen 
Bank.  Generally, decisions as to the use of the funds were made not by the bank but 
by the clients themselves (Jain 1996:82) 
However, as stated earlier the group fund practice soon became controversial.  The 
fund was subject to what was known as ‘group tax’, to which members were liable 
even if they decided to leave the bank (Yunus, 2002).  Under Grameen bank II, the 
group fund was abolished and, in its place, three compulsory weekly saving plans - 
personal, special and pension deposit - were introduced.  The idea was to ensure that 
funds were always available for clients to meet pressing personal needs.  But because 
of the need to maintain a minimum balance of BTk2,000 (about US$30) in the special 
deposit account, withdrawal from this account was only allowed after three years of 
running it.  Thereafter, withdrawals could only be made once every three years.  Only 
under very special circumstances would a client be allowed to withdraw the entire 
amount in the special savings account.  The account also helped finance borrowers’ 
long-term investments, such as the purchase of Grameen Bank shares (Yunus, 2002).   
Pension deposit served as a pension fund for a specific category of members. 
Members whose total loans exceeded BTk8,000 (US $ 138) were required to 
contribute a minimum of BTk50 (US $ 0.86) each month to a pension deposit 
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account. After ten years, a borrower could receive a lump sum of almost double the 
amount he or she had contributed. This provided a great incentive for borrowers to 
save, and became very popular with many borrowers.  Indeed, some offered to save 
up to ten times the mandatory minimum (Yunus, 2002).  
Studies show that obligatory saving plans are among the most important features of 
Grameen Bank lending, and contribute significantly to the bank’s high repayment 
rate.  Microenterprise credit, as earlier pointed out, cannot succeed if there is no 
facility to support consumption and other related needs, and the poor have many 
pressing needs that compete for attention. According to Wright (2000:9), appropriate 
financial services ‘should provide options to minimize shocks arising from illness, 
death, crop failure, theft and price fluctuations while also providing funds for 
investment in income generating activities’.  Grameen Bank’s personal savings plan 
provides the buffer against some of these shocks and, because of the freedom to 
utilize the savings, helps to eliminate pressure on microenterprise credit.     
4.5.10 Loan terms 
One of the main problems of the defunct Grameen Classic System (GCS) was the 
inflexibility of loan terms.  For example, irrespective of a client’s actual business 
needs, there was a limit as to the amount that could be borrowed.  Weekly repayment 
amounts were fixed, and to continue to stay with the bank, clients were required to 
demonstrate a degree of active participation in the scheme by borrowing continuously 
for a whole year, even when they only needed loans for a few months (Yunus, 2002).  
Bank staff had little freedom to exercise their personal judgment when dealing with 
borrowers.  
Under the Grameen Generalised System, loan terms are more flexible.  Clients borrow 
only when they need loans, except that new loans become available to borrowers only 
if their previous loans have been repaid.  A borrower can be granted more than one 
loan type simultaneously (Yunus, 2004b).    Furthermore, bank employees are 
allowed to design loan products to suit clients’ specific needs and to exercise 
judgment when dealing with loan-related issues.  Also, the weekly installment 
amounts can be varied: clients whose business are seasonal can increase their 
installment sizes during peak business season, and pay less during the off peak period. 
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Sometimes, each installment can be of a different size and at other times all 
installments can be exactly equal. The bank believes that flexibility in loan terms 
makes repayment less burdensome. 
There are other facets to the ‘flexibility’ of the Grameen Generalised System (GGS).  
Borrowers are offered two loan types: the basic loan and flexible loan. A basic loan is 
the primary loan product, which clients typically obtain. In the event of default, 
borrowers are not necessarily blacklisted, but are required to take up a flexible loan.  
Under the defunct Grameen Classic System (GCS), loan defaulters were not allowed 
to obtain further loans or renegotiate payments (Mainsah et al, 2004:10). The GGS 
flexible loan regime gives the borrower a second chance to work out a more 
‘favourable’ repayment schedule. Sometimes, to achieve a ‘favourable’ loan term, a 
one-year loan may be extended to three years in order to reduce weekly installments 
to the very minimum, and make it affordable to borrowers (Yunus, 2002). 
Critics question the rationale for the flexible loan.  The Wall Street Journal (2001), for 
example, argues that Grameen Bank uses its rescheduled flexible loan scheme to cast 
itself as a successful and humane operator with high repayment and low default rates, 
when in reality the scheme disguises the fact of loan default.  Grameen Bank, 
however, maintains that provision is always made for rescheduled loans, and that the 
repayment rate of rescheduled flexible loans is over 98% (Mainsah et al, 2004:25). 
Some might find the above criticism of rescheduled flexible loan intriguing.  The 
principle behind the scheme is that of preventing total default. This principle protects 
the lender from losing its money altogether, and the borrower from losing his/her only 
source of income and sinking back into poverty.  Adjusting loan terms to enable 
defaulters to pay up is an idea that could be applied in the conventional credit markets 
to manage loan default, since it may be better for a borrower to pay back little bits of 
the loan over time, than default completely.  Then again, formal lending is collateral-
based, and it may well be that loan terms in this sector is deliberately made 
unfavourable so that borrowers would default and forfeit their pledged assets. Loan 
terms should be flexible enough to accommodate risks faced by borrowers in the 
business place; in short, loan terms should be given a human face. 
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4.5.11 Interest rate 
To ensure sustainability, Grameen Bank as a matter of policy keeps its interest rate as 
close to the prevailing commercial bank lending rate as possible.  However, its 
interest rates vary according to loan type. Although the Bangladeshi government fixes 
22% interest rate for government-run microcredit programmes, the bank’s 
microenterprise (or income generating) loans attract 20% simple interest, while 
housing loans and education loans attract 8% and 5% simple interest respectively.  All 
interests are calculated on a declining balance basis. Loans to struggling clients (such 
as beggars) are interest-free.  On the other hand, the bank pays between 8.5% and 
12% interest on clients’ savings (Yunus, 2004c). Grameen Bank’s 20% simple 
interest rate on microenterprise loans is comparable to the compound interest rate of 
13% to 16% charged by Bangladeshi commercial banks (Kamaluddin, 1993). 
There is an ongoing debate as to whether Grameen Bank’s interest rates are 
sustainable enough to help the bank to post significant profits and pay dividends to its 
shareholders. Kamaluddin (1993) maintains that Grameen Bank is an example of a 
‘totally self-reliant poverty-eradication initiative that does not need a ‘handout’ for its 
survival’.  This assertion seems to have been confirmed by the bank’s decision in 
1995 not to receive any more donor funds - although in 1998 it received the ‘last 
installment’ of an earlier contracted donation.  In 2003, the bank reported a net profit 
of BTk357,518,131 (Grameen Bank, 2003).  
Morduch (1999:236), on the other hand, argues that what the bank calls ‘profitability’ 
was in part a function of the bank’s many years of operating as a donor-funded 
organization, and that it was wrong to underplay this fact when discussing Grameen 
Bank’s profitability. He maintains that Grameen Bank enjoyed subsidies up till 1996. 
Besides, Morduch adds, the bank constantly moves certain categories of expenses and 
treats direct grants as income.  To post profit by all means, the bank does not fully 
recognize soft loans.  Therefore, while its accounts are monitored and certified by 
public accountants, they do not conform strictly to international standards.  Although 
Morduch acknowledges that subsidies are falling and that ‘break-even rates’ are 
closer to what Grameen Bank actually charges, the impact of earlier subsidies should 
not be ignored.  Furthermore, Morduch asserts that interest rates paid by borrowers on 
the various categories of loans are heavily subsidized and that if subsidies were 
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removed, or the effects of subsidies were to wear off completely, interest rates on 
general loans may have to rise to between 40 and 46%, for profitability to be achieved 
(Morduch, 1999: 235-246).  
The arguments around profitability simply show that whether or not Grameen Bank 
was profitable and sustainable at inception, it now charges break-even interest rates 
that make cost recovery and profitability possible.  Subsidies from donor funds also 
sustained the bank up to the point where it could be self-sustaining – an important 
lesson for any country wishing to replicate the Grameen Bank model. 
4.6 Grameen Bank’s Risk Management Techniques    
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the presence of information asymmetries and the pre-
classification of the poor as ‘bad credit risks’ in both formal and informal markets 
makes it difficult for the poor to access credit for microenterprise purposes.  The 
formal credit market mitigates information asymmetry problems through measures 
such as screening, monitoring and credit rationing, among others.  However, as stated 
earlier, these measures screen out the poor.  Grameen Bank seems to have 
innovatively adapted the same techniques to produce the crucial consequence of 
making microenterprise credit available to the poor.  
 
Through its unconventional group lending method, Grameen Bank effectively screens 
out bad credit risks.  First, a bank worker identifies a potential client. Next, this client 
selects four other people with whom she can form a borrower group.  Thereafter, 
group members receive a mandatory training and are given a loan. This process is 
called self-selection.  Although, as noted earlier, the hard core poor may self select 
themselves out of the Grameen Bank scheme, the converse is also true: the hard core 
poor could self select themselves into a creditworthy borrower group. Through shared 
customs, physical proximity and shared social conditions, Grameen Bank’s target 
clients are in a fairly good position to judge one another’s credit-worthiness.  Given 
the information advantage they have, it is unlikely that people will knowingly form 
groups with peers who they believe will expose the whole group to the danger of 
default and closure.  Grameen Bank screens out bad credit risks using the group 
members themselves, and, thus, incurs minimal screening cost.  Formal sector lenders, 
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who typically lend to individuals, must collect information on a person-by-person 
basis in order to avoid adverse selection – a process that may be more cost-intensive. 
 
There is also what might be termed specialization in lending in Grameen Bank 
operations.  As mentioned in Chapter Two, relationship or specialized lending exists 
when lenders focus on specific industries or give out specific loan products over time. 
This form of lending makes lenders knowledgeable about the industry or loan 
product, and thus reduces loan administration costs (Rodriquez and Carbo, 2004: 9). 
Despite the varied credit needs of the poor and the general poverty levels in 
Bangladesh, Grameen Bank specializes in three loan types; namely, loans for 
microenterprise, for housing and for education (Yunus, 2004c).  The bank started off 
with microenterprise loans and later, as part of its broader mandate as contained in its 
Sixteen Decisions, extended its offerings to include housing and education loans. 
Specializing in this way makes for effective administrative monitoring and 
coordination of loan products and end use. Besides, the bank lends mainly to women, 
which makes it easier for their potentials to be harnessed, thus reducing moral hazard.   
 
As opposed to formal sector lenders, which require clients to sign physical contracts 
with restrictive provisions, Grameen Bank has no written contract with its clients and, 
as Yunus (2004b) emphasizes, Grameencredit is ‘based on trust, not on legal 
procedures and system’.  Group members decide on what business activities they 
want to engage in and monitor one another’s progress. Internal cohesion within the 
groups makes it difficult for members to engage in business activities considered 
unduly risky and that may lead to repayment default and/or attract censure from other 
group members (Besley and Coate, 1995:16). In a sense, there is an unwritten (moral) 
covenant in operation which group members themselves enforce.  This reduces moral 
hazard, encourages high repayment rates, and helps to keep transaction charges low.   
 
Long-term customer relationships, an important credit risk management technique in 
conventional lending, is also utilised by Grameen Bank, but in a manner that is 
sensitive to the special circumstances of the poor.   Whereas formal sector lenders 
maintain such relationships mainly to constantly validate clients’ credit-worthiness 
and thus cut down on the cost of obtaining information on clients, Grameen Bank 
utilizes this technique through its group lending methodology.  Borrower groups are 
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formed mainly on the basis of group member’s knowledge of one another’s ‘credit-
worthiness’ and moral standing; and so the bank builds on the high level of group 
self-validation already existing within the group, and grants loans without needing to 
know individual borrowers over a long time.  All possible information that the bank 
would have required concerning a client before granting any loan has already been 
mobilized during the group formation process, and is already in operation within the 
group; therefore, the bank suffers minimal adverse selection and incurs less cost in 
this regard.  Group members’ involvement in each other’s business activities further 
reduces moral hazard and serves the important purpose of helping the bank to build 
long-term relationships with its clients. 
Traditional bank lending requires the use of collateral as a guarantee against default. 
Clients with no collateral are considered bad credit risks and are often screened out 
during the selection process.  Whether clients with collateral are ultimately good to do 
business with, and whether what is pledged as collateral will actually offset the loan 
when default occurs, are often ignored. From the point of view of the poor, collateral 
is a strong deterrent to accessing credit. Grameen Bank’s group lending methodology 
makes a demand not on physical collateral, but on symbolic assets (like trust and 
integrity) – which the bank believes the poor have – and thus makes it possible for 
credit worthy borrowers to be selected from a segment of the population that 
ordinarily lacks physical collateral (see Vigenina and Kritikos, 2004:173).  Members 
of a borrower group monitor one another’s activities, put pressure on one another to 
repay the loan, and generally support themselves in times of difficulty. For the bank, 
these various ‘responsibilities’ of borrower group members reduce monitoring cost, 
adverse selection, as well as moral hazard. It also reduces the possibility of loan 
default and contributes to the bank’s success and profitability. 
While financial institutions grant loans as part of their traditional functions, they often 
ration credit mostly by giving out smaller loan size than borrowers need (Mishkin, 
2004:220).  In theory, this is meant to check moral hazard by compelling borrowers to 
make the most judicious use of borrowed funds.  But, as mentioned in Chapter Two, 
banks also use credit rationing to exclude the poor, create loan dependency for the 
‘creditworthy’, multiply the opportunity to charge interests, insurance and 
administrative costs.  Grameen Bank also draws on the conventional practice of credit 
 57
rationing.    To avoid adverse selection, the bank rations credit by giving out very 
small loans – amounts that the rich and the not-so-poor would find meaningless.  In a 
sense, Grameen Bank’s credit rationing strategy pre-classifies the rich and the not-so-
poor as bad credit risks.  For whatever reasons, Kamaluddin (1993) justifies this 
practice: 
 
Those that are rich and not so poor can ignore the consequences of non-
payment because they might be able to obtain credit somewhere else. Those 
that are poor cannot do the same because they are not credit worthy anywhere 
else except at the ‘loan sharks’ whose interest charges and conditions attached 
to the loan impoverishes them.  They will therefore do everything possible to 
retain Grameen Bank credit access by not defaulting in their loan repayments. 
 
 
In the light of the foregoing, the question might now be asked: what are the specific 
indicators of success of Grameen Bank? The next section attempts to address this 
question.  
 
4.7 Grameen Bank’s ‘Successes’ and Shortcomings  
In discussing the achievements and shortcomings of any financial institution, it is 
important to examine both the balance sheet ‘achievements’ and its impact on clients 
and the broader society.  But from the point of view of microenterprise finance, it is 
probably more crucial to focus on the latter. This is one of the reasons Grameen 
Bank’s operations – and, indeed, microfinance - have sparked several researches, 
discussions, replications and academic debates. The following are widely considered 
some of Grameen Bank’s notable successes and shortcomings: 
4.7.1 Repayment rate 
Grameen Bank’s loan repayment rate is currently 99%, a rate considered very high by 
banking standards, and unmatched by any commercial bank in Bangladesh 
(Kamaluddin, 1993). Given that a repayment rate as high as this is recorded in a 
market conventionally regarded as bad credit risk, it is little surprising that there are 
contentions as to the accuracy of its computation.  Recall a Wall Street Journal’s 
argument, reviewed earlier, that Grameen Bank uses euphemistic codes to describe 
clients who by traditional banking standards would be treated as loan defaulters and 
would probably have forfeited their pledged assets to the bank. An example is its use 
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of so-called flexible loans to reschedule people who failed to pay back their basic 
loans.  But as also indicated earlier, the bank seems to work on the principle that the 
poor must be assisted to graduate out of poverty at all cost, rather than made to sink 
deeper into poverty. 
Were borrowers merely put under intense pressure to repay their loans – regardless of 
whether the loans worked for them or not – then certainly, a 99% recovery rate would 
be nothing but a ‘balance sheet achievement’ for Grameen Bank.  The Wall Street 
Journal’s argument does at least imply that Grameen Bank goes out of its way to 
ensure that the poor repay their loans without going through the humiliating 
harassments that traditionally might be expected to accompany loan default.  It does 
seem, then, that Grameen Bank’s high loan recovery rate is not at the expense of 
clients’ social and economic well-being.  
4.7.2 Transaction costs to clients 
 
In business, transactions costs are not often discussed in terms of their broad social 
benefits: they often form part of discussions around profitability and/or returns on 
investment – for the business owner.  The core principle of business is to pass costs to 
the consumer in order for the business to record good profits.  In credit-related 
businesses (whether formal or informal) transaction costs – as part of total costs - 
include the costs of collecting and analyzing information about present and 
prospective borrowers in order to ascertain their credit worthiness.  This process can 
be costly, and when such costs are transferred to borrowers, loans become expensive 
and repayment becomes excessively burdensome.  Eventually, borrowers might 
decide to opt out of the scheme. 
 
Research has shown that compared to commercial banks, or even informal 
Bangladeshi moneylenders, Grameen Bank’s transaction costs are low (UK Society, 
2000:1).  This is despite the fact that the bank’s loan sizes are small.  From the array 
of customer services it renders to its clients (such as business training, weekly 
meetings with clients, generally taking interest in clients’ business growth) it is 
unlikely that the bank has shortchanged its clients in a deliberate effort to keep 
transaction costs low, and profits high.  Rather, low transaction costs seem to be a 
function of the unique lending features discussed earlier.  The low drop-out rate may 
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also suggest wide social acceptance of the scheme, and this may be attributed in part 
to the fact that borrowers do not regard Grameen Bank loans as unduly expensive or 
exploitative.  Schreiner (1999: 15) confirms this assertion: 
  
People choose to use microfinance because they expect positive net gains. 
Although the size of net gain is usually unknown because its measurement 
requires knowledge of both worth and cost, its sign can be inferred from 
repeated use; if users go back for more, then net gain must be positive. The 
annual drop-out rate at Grameen from 1986 to 1994 was about 5 percent… 
This suggests that most users received positive net gains from membership.  
 
4.7.3 Interest Rates 
 
Closely related to the above discussion on transaction costs is the interest charged on 
loans.  Lenders fix interest rates in order to be able to recover costs and make a profit.  
However, in the quest for ‘normal’ profits, conventional credit providers often fix 
interest rates that are excessive.  On the other hand, as a way of mitigating 
information asymmetry – especially in the absence of collateral - informal 
microlenders ‘price for the risk’, with the result that interest rates become exorbitant. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Grameen Bank charges lower interests than commercial banks 
and other MFIs in Bangladesh.  The low interest rates are in part a reflection of the 
bank’s low transaction costs, and the fact that the bank sets out to make modest, rather 
than ‘normal’, profits.  The bank’s small loans, low transaction costs, low interest 
rates, and regime of modest profits have not only resulted in low borrower drop-out 
rates (Schreiner, 1999: 15), but have had other important social impacts on the 
Bangladeshi society:   
 
It takes an utterly destitute [person] six to ten successive loans (one year each) 
- and a lot of hard work - to cross the poverty line. The first loan is often as 
little as US$50. Average loan size is a little over US$100. In the process, the 
borrower builds a secure self-employment, often employing the whole family. 
54% of Grameen borrowers have thus crossed the poverty line and another 
27% are very close to it. For those who do not perform as well, poor housing in 
rain soaked Bangladesh and chronic ill-health are identified as the major 
reasons (GBSG, 2004). 
 
 60
For all the praise it has received and the microfinance initiatives it has inspired 
worldwide, Grameen Bank has been criticized on the grounds of its inability to reach 
the poorest of the poor in Bangladesh. Indeed, this is a failing it shares with most 
MFIs. Some writers have observed that the very process of selecting clients have the 
potential of leaving out those that matter most.  As indicated earlier, the hard-core 
poor may select themselves out of credit schemes because they consider themselves 
worthless and unable to manage a loan.  On the other hand, especially in the case of 
Grameen Bank, group members might select out those they consider to be poorer, 
more vulnerable and worse credit risks than themselves – people they believe could 
easily default and plunge the group into problems.   
Conversely, studies have shown that the not-so-poor often benefit from microloan 
schemes supposedly meant for the very poor. Develtere and Huybrechts (2002:16) 
have reported a study on Bangladesh Rural Agricultural Credit (BRAC) and Grameen 
Bank in which about 30% of members in both programmes do not belong to the target 
group of ‘very poor’.  
In the specific case of Grameen Bank, Hashemi and Schuler (1997) have explained 
the dilemma of  ‘missed targets’.  According to them: 
since the number of members in each centre is limited, and an individual 
cannot join and receive credit except as a member of a self-selecting group of 
five, it implies that there exists some systematic selection within Grameen 
Bank's broadly defined target group, that causes the very poor to be excluded 
from the group. 
Despite the shortcoming of ‘missed target’, Grameen Bank has remained one of the 
most replicated poverty reduction initiatives in modern history.  One of the more 
innovative examples of such replications is BancoSol, an experiment in Bolivia that 
seeks to go beyond Grameen Bank by extending microenterprise credit to the poor on 
a commercial basis. 
4.8 Commercialisation of Microcredit -The BancoSol Experience 
 
BancoSol did not start out as a commercial bank, but as ‘a nonprofit microlending 
entity’ called PRODEM (BancoSol 2003) with a small client base – much in the 
mould of Grameen Bank. This was in 1986.  Within just two years, its growth 
potential amazed even its founders, as Bolivian commercial banks could no longer 
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meet its demand for loan funds, which now were in excess US$28 million. Spurred by 
this extraordinary success, and with 45,000 micro-businesses in its clientele, almost 
none of whom had defaulted in loan repayment (Koenigsfest, 2001), PRODEM joined 
forces with ACCION International, Calmeadow Foundation, commercial banks and 
other interests to found BancoSol.  This bank is regarded as the world’s first private 
commercial bank dedicated entirely to microenterprise development.  It draws on the 
best-established traditions of commercial banking and the humanistic underpinnings 
of the nonprofit sector.  For instance, in addition to ‘rewarding’ diligent 
microentrepreneurs with larger loans, it insists that intending borrowers show some 
evidence of an ongoing microbusiness.   Besides, it markets more than just 
microenterprise loans – other conventional banking products (including consumption-
related loans) are also on offer.  On the other hand, as part of its developmental 
inclinations, it lends to small groups, charges small interests (of about 6.1%), and 
does not ask for collaterals or personal guarantors outside the borrower group.   
 
By 2003, its branch network had grown to 38, organized under five regional 
headquarters, with a combined ‘active’ client base of 42,831 (about 60% made up of 
women).  The bank claims a ‘more than 40 percent’ market share of the Bolivian 
banking sector, despite holding ‘less than two percent’ of the banking system’s assets 
(BancoSol 2003). The bank lists this solid client base among its core achievements, 
but most importantly – for the purposes of this project - its operations stand as a 
testimony to the fact that ‘lending in small amounts to microentrepreneurs is feasible 
and profitable’ – a fact further borne out by BancoSol’s ranking among the two most 
liquid, most solvent and most profitable banks in Bolivia (BancoSol, 2003). 
 
Gonzalez-Vega et al (1996:5-6) attribute the success of BancoSol to what they call the 
‘intangible assets’ that the bank inherited from PRODEM.  Among these are stock of 
information capital, good client relationship, human capital, good reputation, and 
good connection with international nonprofit networks such as ACCION.  Most of 
these, it must be emphasized, are associated with BancoSol’s humanistic and 
developmental character, cultivated during its years as a nonprofit microlender.  To 
function and succeed as a commercial bank, the bank has no doubt invested in and 
benefited from good organizational design, technological development and 
transformation management (Gonzalez-Vega et al, 1996:19). 
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 Gonzalez-Vega et al (1996:8) have also identified factors that could be regarded as 
disincentives to the developmental aspirations of a microenterprise bank.   Among 
these is the fact that its clients are not necessarily the poorest of the poor, since a 
major precondition for obtaining a loan is evidence of an ongoing microbusiness, 
which must have been running for at least a year.  Besides, employees reportedly 
work in what could be a de-motivating environment, since staff salaries are 
substantially lower than what obtains in other commercial banks.   Indeed, it is 
believed that for BancoSol to continue to operate profitably, it must keep salaries low 
(Glosser, 1994:249). 
Despite such ‘failure factors’, however, BancoSol, not unlike Grameen Bank, is a 
clear demonstration that a robust combination of different microlending models, 
rather than a reliance on a business-as-usual ethos can result in a developmental 
socio-economic environment in which the needs of microenterpreneurs – indeed, the 
needs of the poor - are firmly addressed through the banking sector.    
4.9 Conclusion 
 
Traditional banking is based on a traditional liberal/individualistic model that 
succeeds on the basis of individuals’ ability to meet credit obligations.  The Grameen 
Bank approach demonstrates that it takes more than the liberal-individualistic model 
of traditional banking for credit to reach the poor.  Therefore, the bank anchors its 
lending methodology on collectivist norms, which effectively serve as symbolic 
collateral in a world where physical assets are absent.  A key question is: do these 
norms exist in every society or do they exist only in ‘traditional’ or developing 
societies?  
 
Scholars like Ghatak and Guinnane (1999:197) would argue that villages in low-
income countries (LICs) are close-knit communities and that in developed societies 
‘village norms’ have been washed away by the tides of modernity.  This thesis does 
not embrace this argument.  Rather, it maintains that every society has its collectivist 
norm - whether these exist in family groups, village groups, religious organizations, 
neighbourhood associations, occupational guilds or clubs – and that microcredit 
practice must be preceded by sound ethnographic and sociological research into the 
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bases of collectivist norms, which exist in every society.  Indeed, there is no society 
that is exclusively ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’ in the binary sense in which these terms 
are often used.   
 
Grameen Bank harnessed the collectivist norms in rural Bangladesh; in another 
society, similar norms would be found probably in religious organizations or 
neighbourhood associations.  As shown in this chapter, group or collectivist norms are 
distinct from peer pressure.  While peer pressure might be an ingredient of collectivist 
norms, it is not a sufficient ‘cause’ of conformity, and, therefore, cannot be the main 
reason Grameen Bank clients feel compelled to meet credit obligations.  Peer pressure 
is a product of underlying norms and its effectiveness in inducing conformity is as a 
result of the existence of such underlying norms.  This is what has helped Grameen 
Bank to largely mitigate information asymmetry problems.  Jain’s (1996:83) findings 
from his study of Grameen Bank support this assertion: ‘all group and even centre 
members lived in the same neighbourhood and often shared the same profession.  This 
led to considerable interactions among group and centre members’. 
 
Despite the model’s shortcomings, Grameen Bank has achieved what successful 
commercial banks have not.  Whereas commercial banks lend based on collateral and 
especially to people who are relatively well off, Grameen Bank lends based on ‘trust’ 
– and lends to the very poor.  Commercial banks are usually concentrated in cities 
and men constitute the majority of their clients.  Grameen Bank, on the other hand, 
operates in villages and women are its major clients.  Because they are profit making, 
commercial banks lend to people with proven ability to repay and who have clear 
evidence of entrepreneurship.  Grameen Bank lends to poor women who, according 
to Yunus, have nothing but their integrity and their innate entrepreneurial abilities 
(Discovery Channel, 2003).  While commercial bank borrowers cannot enjoy further 
loans unless they have repaid earlier ones, Grameen Bank lends money to help clients 
get out of the encumbrance of earlier loans, and get on with their business pursuits.  In 
one word, Grameen Bank represents a paradigm shift in the allocation of financial 
resources (Mainsah et al, 2004:25). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As stated in Chapter One, this thesis focuses on microcredit practice in South Africa, 
and in particular, factors impeding access to microenterprise loans.  Grameen Bank is 
introduced in this chapter to highlight specific features associated with the widely 
acclaimed ‘successes’ of the microcredit sector in Bangladesh, and to explore some 
hidden lessons in such ‘success factors’ for microcredit practice in South Africa.  This 
chapter is concerned with the presentation and analysis of the various primary and 
secondary data collected for the study.   
 
It has so far been shown in this work that microlenders in South Africa fall into at 
least three broad categories, namely: private sector (registered and unregistered); 
nonprofit lenders, and government-backed lenders.  The present chapter restricts itself 
to registered private sector microlenders and the government-backed microlender, 
known as Khula Enterprise Finance.  The analysis emphasizes activities of KhulaStart 
retail outlets.  Unregistered private sector microlenders are outside the scope of the 
project, as they typically operate informally or underground.  Nonprofit MFIs were 
also not examined separately, since in practice they are the operational channels (or 
retail outlets) through which Khula Enterprise Finance actualises its microlending 
mandate.   
 
The chapter also draws on secondary data from the Microfinance Regulatory Council 
(MFRC).  The presentation and analysis – as well as summaries and conclusions – 
that follow are based on data relating to KhulaStart retail outlets, registered private 
sector microlenders, and Grameen Bank.  
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 5.2 Data Presentation 
 
5.2.1  Primary data from registered private sector microlenders 
 
Registered private sector microlenders comprise bank and non-bank registered 
operators. They are registered with the MFRC under the Usury Act exemption notice, 
and file their monthly returns with the Council. Examples of registered (commercial) 
bank microlenders are ABSA, Capitec, and African Bank.  They have branches all 
over the country, and use similar and standardized microlending procedures.  Thus, a 
Capitec Bank branch in Johannesburg operates in much the same way as a branch in 
Port Elizabeth.  The Grahamstown branches of the three banks mentioned were 
visited for this study, and their managers in charge of microloans were interviewed. 
 
Non-bank microloan operators are localized, and are usually many in any one city.  
However, they too adopt the same lending procedures and modalities used by the 
bank-affiliated micro-lenders.  Seven of these operators in Grahamstown were visited 
for this study and their managers, in a few cases owners, were interviewed.   
 
The same set of questions were asked to both bank and non-bank microlenders.  The 
interview sought responses to questions pertaining to, among others: 
- loan type (end use of loan) 
- loan term (short-, medium-, or long-term) 
- category of loan grantees (who qualifies for a loan) 
- loan size 
- monitoring of end use of loan 
- ways of promoting microenterprise development 
- interest rate charges 
 
The interview revealed that non-bank microlenders typically lend money to people in 
short-term financial need.  Loan period ranges from one to three months, and 
sometimes four to twelve months.  Banks give both short-term and long-term 
microloans, and long-term loans range from 12 to 24months.  Long-term loans are 
mainly for housing, education and negligibly to small business expansion. Housing 
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and education loans make up about 80% of long-term loans, while the remaining 20% 
goes into business expansion. The most important loan criterion is a regular income 
stream.  What this means is that (bank) microlenders typically lend to salary earners 
and pensioners; this make up about 90% of their microcredit clients.  Some banks 
give a very negligible portion of their loan to self-employed clients but those that are 
not in any form of employment do not access any loan. 
 
Private sector non-bank lenders sometimes give consideration to borrowers’ level of 
income.  The posting of collateral – in the traditional banking sense of this term - is 
not a lending precondition.  However, a borrower will normally be required to present 
his or her identity document, proof of regular income (sometimes in the form of one 
to three months’ pay slip), and names of personal referees.  Loan sizes range between 
R50 and R10, 000 with interest charges in the region of 11% and 40%.  Repayment is 
monthly and commences at the end of the month, for the length of the contract.  
 
A key feature of microlending under the private sector bank/non-bank category is that 
the end-use of the loan is not monitored.  Generally both the lender and borrower 
know that it is for short-term consumption-related needs. Some lenders in this 
category make use of information supplied by credit bureaus and the Information 
Trust Cooperation (ITC) to assess the borrower’s credit worthiness and ability to 
repay.  Any borrower whose name appears in any one of these documents is refused a 
loan.  In most cases, repayment through bank debits is preferred to cash payments 
because this method is more reliable and ensures that deduction is made at source 
before the borrower can access the salary or pension account to which the loan is 
linked.  It is also possible that many borrowers know the added legal complication of 
consistently defaulting on bank debit orders - a psychological self-check which 
lenders easily capitalize on. 
 
Some lenders employ debt collectors - or ‘credit controllers’, as they are often called - 
to relate with clients.  Such relations take place mainly by correspondence, although 
occasionally, personal visits become necessary after loans have been granted. 
Respondents indicated that the motivation for visits is not entirely that of client-
welfare.  Ironically, it is also often not for debt collection either.  Private sector 
bank/non-bank microlending has become so competitive that some form of ‘customer 
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relations’ has become imperative, if only to guard against ‘client-poaching’, which, as 
one respondent indicated to this researcher, is increasingly becoming a feature of the 
business. On average, bad debt is about 20% of loan disbursements and is contributed 
mostly by salary earners.   
 
The private sector bank/non-bank microlenders interviewed did not think they were 
under any pressure to change their lending features, as beneficiaries of their facilities 
are pre-defined as those who have the ability (typically, through being salary earners) 
to repay.  Mainly for this same reason, gender is not a lending criterion. Non-salary or 
very low-income earners are perceived as a business risk and do not count even as a 
‘potential’ market.  Lenders do not consider themselves to be in the business of 
promoting microenterprises or skills training, as these involve considerable risks and 
costs.  Those interviewed, however, expressed the view that they could support such 
objectives if government provided funding or guaranteed loans given for such 
purposes.  
5.2.2 Secondary Data from Microfinance Research Council (MFRC) 
 
The MFRC collects and publishes information regarding activities of all registered 
microlenders. Published information is based on returns submitted by registered 
lenders as a requirement of the Usury Act exemption notice. Information covers 
lenders’ total disbursements, number of loans, size of the loan book, loan clients, 
average loan size, average loan debts, types of disbursement and other disclosures. 
Table 1 below shows the trend of loan disbursements by the various registered 
microlender categories between December 2001 and May 2004:   
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 Table 1: Loan disbursements by size (December 2001-May 2004) 
LOAN DISBURSEMENTS 
 
Dec 2001 – Feb 2002  
 
Dec 2002 – Feb 2003 
 
Dec 2003 – Feb 2004 
 
March – May 2004 
 
 
LENDER 
CATEGORY 
 Loans Loan Size (Rand) Loans 
Loan Size 
(Rand) Loans 
Loan Size 
(Rand) Loans 
Loan Size 
(Rand) 
Banks 621,749 1,020,830,776 723,449 1,036,578,566 913,944 1,636,730,124 939,680 1,659,623,102 
P Co’s* 57,050 51,333,224 34,582 40,613,744 2,033 7,277,122 6,992 11,259,020 
Pvt Co’s** 812,623 1,436,859,286 1,058,480 1,593,465,017 963,275 1,939,882,689 960,326 1,809,761,366 
CC+ 827,960 513,914,841 965,632 569,096,180 1,072,573 678,333,035 1,235,837 783,602,918 
Trusts 77,772 42,003,081 82,068 50,395,453 86,274 55,942,936 82,286 53,804,356 
Co-op++ 24,104 61,569,310 24,226 65,656,324 20949 55,410,450 21,317 57,390,312 
Sect 21+++ 13,979 20,847,125 13,953 28,375,164 17,548 36,391,908 18,522 41,625,177 
Total 2,435,237 3,147,357,643 2,902,390 3,384,180,448 3,076,596 4,409,968,265 3,264,961 4,417,066,252 
Source: MFRC, 2004c  
Key: *Public Companies; ** Private Companies; +Close corporations;  ++Cooperatives ; +++NGOs;  
              
 
Table 1 illustrates the notion of the South African microcredit industry as a ‘fast 
growing’ one.  It shows significant increases in loan size and number of loans from 
the period December 2001 and May 2004.  Banks, private companies and close 
corporations, enjoy the largest industry share in terms of both loan size and number of 
loan.  However, their loans, as noted in the previous section, are not for 
microenterprise purposes.  Section 21 companies, which comprise NGOs and MFIs, 
focus on microenterprise lending.  Strikingly, as shown in the graph below (Figure 1), 
their share of total industry disbursements – both in terms of actual amounts disbursed 
and number of loan recipients - is among the smallest.  
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Figure 1: NGO/MFI loan disbursements as a percentage of total 
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Source: MFRC, 2004c  
 
Figure 1 above shows microenterprise credit - represented by NGOs disbursements - 
as a percentage of total disbursements.  In each of the yearly totals, that is, the period 
from December, 2001 to May 2004, NGOs disbursed just less than 1% of microcredit 
loans.  Since their disbursements are mainly for microenterprise purposes, Table 1 and 
Figure 1 could be interpreted to mean that microenterprise lending is at the bottom of 
the scale of preference in the South African microlending industry.  It also indicates 
the limited reach of NGOs and MFIs to microentrepreneurs.  
 
Total loan disbursements for the period between March and May 2004 (in Table 1 
above) are broken down into different loan types, as shown in Table 2 below:  
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 Table 2: Loan disbursements by type (March-May 2004) 
Loan Type Share of industry disbursements 
Housing 11% 
Education 13% 
SMMEs 4%* 
Unclassified 72%+ 
Source: MFRC, 2004c 
*The 4% SMMEs share of industry disbursements is higher than the actual amount of approximately 
R42 million disbursed by Section 21 companies, as shown in Table 1.  The actual disbursement by 
Section 21 companies to SMMEs is less than 1% of total industry disbursements.  The likely reason for 
this discrepancy is that the 4% shown in this table includes isolated microenterprise loans offered by 
some banks during the period. 
+ Not shown in MFRC Statistics, but deduced mathematically for the purposes of this table. 
 
 
Table 2 illustrates further the realities of Table 1 and that of Figure 1.  The table 
shows each loan type as a percentage of the total.  Housing loans are those taken out 
mainly for the construction of very low-cost houses and partly for the repairs and 
maintenance of existing property.  Banks extend some of these loans but NGOs often 
grant a larger part of it as part of the development content of their microlending 
mandate.  Banks and other private lenders grant education loans, while SMME loans 
are extended mostly by NGOs and, negligibly, by a few banks.  
 
Table 2 above also shows that compared to microenterprise lending of 4%, housing 
and education loans had a considerably good share, of 11% and 13% respectively.  A 
fair assumption would be that the ‘unclassified’ 72% of total disbursements was for 
short-term consumption expenditure.  Typically, these are loans extended by lenders 
other than NGOs. Is this an indication of an aversion to microenterprise lending?  The 
4% loan disbursements to SMMEs out of the total disbursements suggest this could be 
the case. 
 
A Finance24 (2004) report on disbursements in the microloan sector in the quarter 
ending August 2004 illustrates recent growth trends: 
 
- Growth in total loan disbursements from R4.42 billion in May 2004 to R4.91 
billion in August, 2004 
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- Number of loans increased by 8% from 3.26m in May 2004 to 3.5m in August, 
2004 
- Banks enjoyed a 14% increase in lending between May and August 2004, with a 
total lending of R1.9 billion 
- Private companies enjoyed 11% increase from R1.81 billion in May 2004 to R2.0 
billion in August 2004 
- Close Corporations, Trusts and public companies enjoyed a combined increase of 
8% in disbursement, to R917 million in August 2004 
- Section 21 companies are hailed to have recorded the highest growth of 20%, 
from R41.6 million in May, to almost R5 million in August 2004.  
 
Although the report indicates that the industry is expanding at a ‘satisfactory and 
controllable rate’ in terms of number of borrowers and total amount of loans issued, 
indicating ‘maturity in the industry’ (Finance24, 2004), the fact is disguised that the 
growth is mostly associated with short-term consumption credit.  For example, banks 
and other players enjoyed good increases in lending, which when combined, hide any 
increases recorded by the Section 21 companies (the microenterprise lenders).  
Although Section 21 companies enjoyed the ‘strongest growth’, according to the 
report, their industry share is comparatively insignificant.  
 
5.2.3  Khula Enterprise Finance – KhulaStart retail outlets 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, KhulaStart is a microlending scheme which reaches the 
end-user through retail outlets.  These are NGOs and MFIs operating mainly in rural 
areas and townships.  The scheme’s reach is hampered by the fact that it is 
represented in many localities by very few NGOs and MFIs.  In the Eastern Cape, for 
example, with some of the biggest townships in the country (such as Mdantsane in 
East London), only five retail outlets were in operation up to the middle of 2004.  By 
December of the same year, Eastern Cape retail outlets had reduced to three.  For the 
purposes of this study data were obtained from two of these outlets – Hlumisanani in 
Zwide (Port Elizabeth) and Libec in Mthatha.    
 
The operational thrust of the KhulaStart scheme occurs at two broad levels.  There are 
those activities that take place before any actual disbursements are made, but are 
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considered an integral part of the lending process and vital to the success of the 
microenterprise development objective.  These are called ‘pre-lending’ activities.  On 
the other hand, there are some activities that take place from the time of actual loan 
disbursements and are considered essential to the success of the ‘business’ side of the 
mandate, as they ensure that the loans will actually be repaid.  But even this second, 
‘post-lending’ set of activities – such as monitoring of end-use - are rooted (in theory 
at least) in the imperative of microenterprise development.  Pre and post-lending 
activities are discussed in more depth below. 
 5.2.3.1 Pre-lending activities – Hlumisanani and Libec 
 
Khula Enterprise Finance offers training to the staff of the KhulaStart retail outlets in 
order to acquaint them with the microlending model and also to instil in them what 
one might call a complimentarity of perspective.   In other words, the company hopes 
to instil a strong awareness that it is involved in a developmental activity and not one 
meant to achieve short-term consumption-related ends.  Every year it releases funds 
amounting to about R300,000 to each retail outlet.  In terms of Khula’s policy, the 
retail outlets are obliged to target only the unemployed, people with no business, or 
those managing an existing small business.  In short, KhulaStart loans are for small 
business start up and business expansion.  
 
As a matter of policy preference is given to women.  About 80% of the Hlumisanani’s 
and Libec’s clients are women.  This is in line with the United Nations microcredit 
model, which incidentally the world body adopted from Grameen Bank.  Gender 
preference is predicated on the belief that, historically, women constitute the poorest 
of the poor.  20% of KhulaStart loans are given to men under special circumstances, 
for example, those with certain disabilities, and those caring for an aged person who is 
not receiving social grant. But even in this latter case, the rule is that the loans will be 
used for microenterprise activities that will eventually ameliorate the plight of both 
the disabled and the care-giver. 
   
Inspired by the Grameen model, the KhulaStart scheme uses a group lending 
methodology.  Women are encouraged to form themselves into groups of between 3 
and 10 and the retail outlets lend only to them as members of a group.  After being 
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assessed and approved a newly formed group is put through three weeks of training 
on basic financial management. Upon completion, each group member receives a loan 
of between R300 and R3500.  Each group appoints a leader whose duty is to, among 
others, ensure that members meet repayment obligations – often by collecting the 
repayment instalments herself and handing these to the staff of the retail outlets at 
their regular meetings. Respondents both at Hlumisanani and Libec indicated that the 
group-leader-as-debt-collector practice has its weakness.  Occasionally the group 
leader uses up the instalments, thus technically causing the entire group to default.  
 
Usually, only about 30-40% of loan applicants are successful. The staff interviewed at 
both retail outlets explained that often, unsuccessful applicants are those considered 
‘illiterate’ and ‘untrainable’.  The interviews, however, revealed that the retail outlets 
had no clear criteria for assessing who is ‘trainable’ and who is not. 
   
No collateral is required and there is no uniformity as to the registration fees charged. 
At Zwide and Libec, registration fee was R150 and R50 respectively.  These fees are 
non-refundable and are allegedly for ‘administrative expenses’. Only applicants who 
accept this condition are considered for loans.   If a borrower cannot afford this 
payment the amount is deducted from the approved loan.  Although the KhulaStart 
scheme tends to favour business in tourism and local craft, borrowers are nevertheless 
required to indicate the nature of business they wish to go into.  The retail outlets 
interviewed claimed that they take this process further by conducting a feasibility 
study to ascertain the viability of such a venture, especially in the context of the 
borrower’s residential neighbourhood. As a rule, loans are granted only for businesses 
deemed ‘viable’ and to existing businesses.  
 
In the past, borrowers could buy their goods themselves with the start-up loans.  This 
practice has been discontinued due to repayment problems.   Retail outlets found that 
most borrowers were either not investing the whole amounts in the business or were 
simply squandering the money. Existing practice, therefore, is to purchase the 
business-ware on behalf of borrowers rather than hand them cash. But according to 
the retailers interviewed, even this alternative has been subverted as some borrowers 
simply haul the ware back to the suppliers and exchange it for cash!  
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Retail outlets allow a three-month moratorium; thereafter repayment is made monthly 
or quarterly depending on a borrower’s preference. This ‘dispersed repayment’, as the 
respondents called it, is to reduce cost of collection – which in turn keeps transaction 
costs low.  No additional borrowing is approved except to a borrower who has fully 
re-paid an earlier loan.  Group pressure is used to ensure loan repayment but joint 
liability is not enforced.  
 
 5.2.3.2 Post-lending activities – Hlumisanani and Libec 
 
KhulaStart retail outlets employ field workers to provide ‘after sales services’ to 
borrowers to ensure repayment.  Both retail outlets employ between 40 and 45 field 
workers, who oversee about 1,300 microentrepreneurs.  They visit borrowers once 
every three months to monitor progress of clients’ business activities in addition to 
offering business- or loan-related advice.  Ironically, according to the staff 
interviewed, ‘after sales’ efforts are often rebuffed by borrowers.  Borrowers view 
these efforts as an indication of distrust in their entrepreneurial abilities. Also, these 
meetings with field workers are often the only occasions where group members meet 
at all and where group leaders collect loan repayment instalments. 
  
The retail outlets charge between 2% and 2.5% interest on loans.  In the last 24 
months the size of bad debt of the Port Elizabeth and Mthatha outlet was in the region 
of R90,000 - or 30% of total loan disbursements. In Port Elizabeth about 40% of 
borrowers ‘succeed’ in their business in terms of profitability and business continuity. 
There are a few isolated cases of remarkable business success.  Another 30% of 
borrowers were said to be ‘struggling’.  
 5.2.3.3 Challenges 
 
According to the respondents, a key challenge the retail outlets face is the issue of 
HIV and AIDS.  In both Port Elizabeth and Mthatha the interviewees claimed, 
without any concrete supporting documents, that ‘about 10% of borrowers’ were HIV 
positive, and that there had been cases where people with outstanding loans fell sick 
and died.  According to the staff interviewed, Khula does not require borrowers to 
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disclose their HIV status as a precondition for obtaining a loan.  HIV and AIDS, they 
said, was a major explanation for their relatively poor bad debt record. 
 
Getting members to attend the quarterly meeting is also a difficulty.  Older women 
take the meetings ‘more seriously’ than younger women.   According to an 
interviewee in the Port Elizabeth outlet, clients below 35 years of age ‘show no 
seriousness and feel no obligation’ to repay their loans.  They are ‘very mobile’ in 
terms of relocating from one area to another and often have ‘relationship problems’ 
that tend to affect their business and loan repayment obligations.   This same problem 
was observed in Mthatha outlet. However, in terms of Khula’s policy, age is not a 
factor in loan access.  Therefore, clients that fall within this age bracket and meet loan 
conditions continue to enjoy the loan. 
 
There is no enforcement of joint liability.  If a member is unable to repay over a long 
time, she is required to report herself to the police.  The police then investigate the 
borrower to ascertain if indeed she is ‘bankrupt’.  If the police confirm this to be the 
case, she will be issued a document indicating her inability to pay.  When the 
borrower presents this document to the retail outlet, she is no longer required to repay 
the outstanding balance.  After three years, the debt is written off. 
 
One instructive finding was that some loan clients blame their business performance – 
and associated credit behaviour – on their husbands and partners who interfere in the 
business by squandering sales proceeds.  Intervention by KhulaStart retail outlets in 
such cases sometimes aggravates the plight of the female microenterpreneurs, who are 
faced with bouts of domestic violence for ‘daring to expose to outsiders’ their men’s 
financial situation and social behaviour.  This finding supports earlier microfinance 
research that was reviewed in Chapter Four of this work highlighting the problems of 
lending to women. 
 
An interesting finding - one that underlines a strong need to understand what has been 
referred to in this work as ‘Grameen Bank success features’ - is that KhulaStart retail 
outlets have from time to time had to return ‘unutilized funds’ to Khula, because ‘our 
coverage area is rural’ and ‘most of our potential clients are illiterate and untrainable’.  
Conversely, the retail outlets have experienced bureaucratic delays in obtaining loan 
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funds from Khula and thus have faced situations where they cannot meet their lending 
obligations timeously. 
 
5.3  Discussion of Findings 
 
5.3.1 Comparison of the private sector, KhulaStart and Grameen 
microlending features 
 
In Table 3 below, an attempt is made to compare the features of three microlending 
‘models’ – those of South African private sector microlenders, KhulaStart and 
Grameen Bank – with particular attention paid to factors that promote or inhibit 
access to microenterprise loans.  Access factors here refer to eligibility criteria, and 
answer the question, ‘who is eligible for loans?’ (See Simanowitz and Walter, 
2002:17).  The aim of this comparison is to show the implications of the various 
models for microenterprise credit access, job creation and poverty reduction. 
 
Table 3: A comparison of three microlending ‘models’ 
 
 
MICROLENDING 
FEATURE 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
LENDER 
 
KHULA 
ENTERPRISE 
FINANCE 
 
 
GRAMEEN BANK 
 
Lending to the ‘poor’ 
(unemployed, self 
employed, illiterates) 
No. The ‘poor’ are 
considered a bad 
‘credit risk’ 
Yes – subject to 
completion of 3 weeks’ 
training. But core 
‘illiterate’ are denied 
access to loans. 
Yes – subject to 
completion of one-
week training.  The 
poor are considered 
‘good credit risks’. 
Collateral as lending 
criterion 
Technically, no. But 
one to three months’ 
bank statements 
required as evidence of 
regular earnings.  
Referees sometimes 
required. 
No  No 
Gender preference 
No. Ability to repay is 
paramount.  Not a 
development lending 
model 
Yes.  80% lending to 
women, universally 
considered poorest of 
the poor. 
Yes. Over 90% lending 
to women, universally 
considered poorest of 
the poor. 
Group lending No.  Individual lending is the rule. 
Yes.  Groups of 3-10 
favoured. 
 
Yes.  Groups of 5 
favoured. 
 
Client seeking by staff No.  Clients go to lenders. 
No.  Clients go to 
lenders. 
Yes. 
Field workers prospect 
for clients, who then 
find others, with whom 
to form groups. 
Repayment Usually monthly Monthly or quarterly Mandatory weekly or 
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MICROLENDING 
FEATURE 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
LENDER 
 
KHULA 
ENTERPRISE 
FINANCE 
 
 
GRAMEEN BANK 
 
periodicity repayments repayments depending 
on clients’ choice. 
 
bi weekly repayments 
Compulsory savings 
as part of loan 
condition 
No At Hlumisanani, No At Libec, Yes 
Yes. Compulsory 
savings in the form of 
personal, special and 
pension savings. 
Flexibility of loan 
terms 
To a large extent, not 
flexible.  Sometimes 
the non bank lenders 
make personal 
arrangements with 
“regular” borrowers. 
To a large extent, not 
flexible. Flexibility 
only in the choice of 
monthly or quarterly 
repayments 
There is flexibility in 
terms of loan size and 
loan repayments.   
Sustainable interest 
rate 
Yes 
Between 12 and 40%.  
Profit is the main 
motive. 
No.  Only between 2% 
and 2.5% because the 
loans are subsidized by 
the state. 
 
Yes. Rates are applied 
on a sliding scale: 20% 
for microenterprise 
loan, 8% for housing 
and 5% for education 
loans 
Lending for 
productive purposes 
To a large extent, No. 
 
Loans are mainly 
granted to meet short 
term needs. Sometimes 
small education loans 
Yes - for starting and 
expanding existing 
small business  
Yes - mostly for 
starting and expanding 
existing business. 
Housing and education 
loans are also given as 
part of the 
comprehensive 
programme.  
Multiple loans 
No 
Initial loans are offset 
before giving 
additional loans 
Only on full repayment 
of an initial loan. 
Yes – on partial 
repayment of initial 
loans. 
Loan size Not very small loan size 
On the average, loan 
size is about R1000 
Very small loan size - 
to discourage the not-
so-poor. 
Registration fee as 
loan criterion 
No. 
 
Yes – R150 
“commitment fee” 
mandatory. 
No. 
Source: Data collected and adapted from Grameen Bank lending features, MFRC and Khula 
Enterprise Finance 
 
 
For many people, especially in the developing world, microenterprises provide 
income and employment where other alternatives are not readily available (Otero and 
Rhyne, 1994:1).  There is always the possibility that people engaging in, or aspiring to 
go into, these businesses have working capital or venture capital problems.  In South 
Africa, this is glaringly the case.  The extent of access to microenterprise credit could 
be observed from the above table, which summarizes the characteristics of the major 
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players in the microlending industry.  Below are key deductions from the three 
models presented in Table 3, especially in terms of microenterprise credit access. 
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5.3.2 Private sector microlenders 
 
Although private sector microloans do not call for collateral they also do not seem to 
be attractive to a wide segment of the ‘loan-needy’ population.  This is probably 
because requirements in terms of bank statements and personal referees anticipate that 
prospective applicants are already banked.  The ‘unbanked’ and those with no 
credible referees, who could obtain loans for microbusiness ventures, are effectively 
shut out.  These seeming subtle requirements could be equated with collateral 
requirement in the formal credit market, and serves the purpose of screening out 
people already preclassified as bad credit risks. 
 
 Unlike Grameen Bank, South African private sector lenders service individuals qua 
individuals, charge ‘sustainable’ interest rates since they are in business, and provide 
credit mostly to meet short-term needs rather than for productive purposes. They have 
no gender preference since they are not development microlenders.  Because they 
give short-term consumption credit they do not bother about long-term implications of 
such credit, that is, savings is not required as condition for the loan.  However, no 
registration fee is required and the loans are usually relatively small.     
 
Ledgerwood (1999:47) argues that microlending practices may be a question of the 
choice of target. According to him, microlenders could be targeting economic, 
sociopolitical or psychological impact.  Economic impact, for example, could mean 
enterprise promotion, gains in income, household aggregate wealth accumulation, 
income or economic resource protection – and microlenders could have any 
combination of these ‘targets’ in mind when designing their loan models.  The data 
presented so far would seem to suggest that registered private sector lenders adopt 
household wealth accumulation, income and economic resource protection as their 
microlending target.  Although this ‘economic impact’ reduces economic insecurity 
and protects clients against vulnerabilities caused by economic shocks (Ledgerwood, 
1999:48), one could argue that it is harmful to ignore enterprise promotion – a major 
prerequisite for job creation and poverty reduction.  Household wealth accumulation, 
income and economic resource protection are based on conventional ideas of banking, 
which see credit as an individual affair.  The South African situation is a glaring 
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example of how aggressive socio-political engineering (such as took place under 
apartheid) could pre-structure poverty and unemployment in a society.  Invariably 
also, the South African situation demonstrates that individualist notions of credit 
cannot make a dent on the malaise of poverty and unemployment unless the 
microcredit industry prioritizes and targets enterprise promotion alongside other 
‘impacts’. 
5.3.3 KhulaStart 
 
The KhulaStart scheme targets the poor.  Its ‘economic impact’ - to again use 
Ledgerwood’s (1999:48) phrase - is that of enterprise promotion.   Like Grameen 
Bank, Khula gives preference to women, lends without collateral, lends to people as 
members of small borrower groups - although the Mthatha retail outlet occasionally 
gives individual loans - and gives loans only for business start-ups and expansion.  It 
theoretically encourages microenterprise credit access.  Subsidized interest rates 
encourage access and reduce repayment burdens on the borrowers, while intensive 
training on rudimentary financial management increases borrowers’ management 
skills and reduces the possibility of loan failure while also helping to broaden access 
to loans.  Whereas Grameen Bank gives multiple loans to support further business 
expansion, KhulaStart loans are given in sequence and if initial loans are not paid up 
no new loans are given.  
 
In practice, unlike Grameen Bank, KhulaStart retail outlets do not look for clients.  
Clients often stumble upon information regarding the scheme, usually from existing 
beneficiaries, and through scanty publicity.  In a way, those who need the scheme 
most do not have much knowledge of its existence (Mashego, 2003:29).  The retail 
outlets require registration fees, which is a setback to microcredit access.  As a policy, 
Khula has no savings programme for the clients, although on its own, Libec recently 
introduced compulsory savings as a way of stabilizing its clients’ financial needs. 
These features and shortcomings hinder microcredit awareness and access.  
 
Especially among the deprived segments of the population, which constitute the target 
market of KhulaStart, information management is a delicate task because of the 
meanings people attach to particular concepts.  Registration fee, for example, can be 
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construed as ‘extortion’ and people can avoid KhulaStart loans simply on account of 
such perception.   
 
Although the scheme has made some inroads into the poor segments of the South 
African population and has helped a number of underprivileged people to set up small 
businesses, its coverage is still very small, considering the credit needs of the vast 
majority of the poor.  The low coverage is evident in the very small number of retail 
outlets that service the microenterprise sector; for example, as indicated earlier, by 
December 2004, only three retail outlets serviced the entire Eastern Cape Province, 
while Limpopo Province has none.  Also there is no uniformity in the microcredit 
outlets’ (MCOs’) lending practices, and this makes it difficult for Khula to properly 
coordinate and monitor their activities.  For example, Libec (in Mthatha) sometimes 
grants individual loans while Hlumisanani (Port Elisabeth) does not.  There are also 
differences in administration fees between outlets.  It was observed that MCOs’ 
administration of loan funds does not always comply with Khula’s microcredit 
outlines. The laxity in monitoring and control probably explains the media image of 
the KhulaStart MCOs as inept, fraud-ridden and loss-making outfits. 
 
KhulaStart credit does not involve a savings package and beneficiaries are not 
compelled to open a savings account with formal banks as a precondition for 
accessing the scheme.  This may hamper business continuity and expansion because 
where clients lack access to funds to meet emergency consumption needs, they can 
easily squander microenterprise loans – and repayment suffers when this happens.  
Besides, in terms of KhulaStart guidelines, a client who has not fully repaid initial 
loans cannot access further loans, for whatever good purpose.  
 
5.3.4 Grameen Bank 
 
As a policy, Grameen Bank focuses on microenterprise lending.  The economic 
impact of such lending is evident in the growth of the microenterprise sector in rural 
Bangladesh and in improvements in borrowers’ incomes.  The bank gives preference 
to women, lends to groups, and does not require collateral. No registration fees are 
charged and field workers maintain close contact with clients.  These features bolster 
broad-based access to microenterprise loans.  Small loan sizes ensure that lending 
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remains focused on the poor – and on the borrower’s business pursuits – rather than 
on the ‘not-so-poor’.  To ensure that borrowers do not divert microenterprise loans to 
other uses, the bank maintains a compulsory savings scheme through which borrowers 
meet emergency and short-term contingency needs.  The reason is that savings reduce 
pressure on microenterprise credit and ensure long-term survival and growth of 
microenterprises (Rhyne and Otero, 1994:13).  
 
Multiple loans support expansion of existing businesses.  The bank does not require 
full settlement of earlier loans before granting additional loans.  When an initial loan 
has been repaid up to a point without default, an additional loan may be granted to 
expand the business.  This helps the business to be grounded.   
 
A major weakness of the Grameen Bank scheme, as stated in previous chapter, is that 
borrowers are required to commence repayment one week after obtaining a loan, and 
thereafter, to repay weekly – a policy that could discourage prospective borrowers 
who might fear that their intended business ventures would not produce enough 
returns within such short intervals.  Also, other than the one-week orientation given to 
new bank clients aimed at acquainting them with the banks’ lending rules and 
operational norms, Grameen Bank does not offer any form of business training to 
borrowers.  
 
By contrast, KhulaStart beneficiaries are required to repay their loans monthly after 
an initial three-month moratorium, in addition to benefiting from a three-week basic 
financial management training – a package commonly seen as vital to the long-term 
survival of small businesses.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
Information asymmetries in the microcredit market influence to a large extent the 
design of microlending schemes and the delineation of target markets.  For example, 
private sector lenders traditionally adopt loan eligibility criteria that favour clients 
with regular income streams.  This tends to exclude the self-employed, the 
unemployed and the illiterate.  This approach at the very best ensures repayment, but 
it stunts microenterprise development.  By focusing on existing household ‘wealth’ 
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and ‘resource stability’, private sector microlending practice ignores that sphere of 
credit that has long-term impacts on borrowers and society as a whole.  
 
By contrast, both KhulaStart scheme and Grameen Bank adopt enterprise promotion 
as a core microlending strategy, and utilise innovative approaches to mitigate the 
problems of information asymmetry.   Such approaches include group lending (by 
which credit behaviour is checked through group dynamics), lending to women 
(traditionally regarded as low credit risks), and credit rationing (which entails small 
loan sizes).  Together, these features allow credit access and ensure repayment. 
 
However, unlike Grameen Bank, KhulaStart retail outlets do not prospect for clients 
to increase loan access, do not encourage savings, but impose registration fees to elicit 
borrower commitment.  Although these approaches may help to reduce adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, they limit microenterprise credit access.  
Grameen Bank demonstrates through its lending features that despite informational 
problems in the microcredit market, microenterprise loans can be made widely 
available to the poor and good repayment rates ensured.  Above all, the bank 
demonstrates that the poor are ‘good credit risks’. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
6.1 Summary and Conclusion 
 
There exists in the formal credit market ways of dealing with information 
asymmetries.  Commercial banks have flourished precisely because lending is 
collateral-based, and there are standardized measures of screening out bad credit risks, 
as well as established protocols for monitoring borrower behaviour.  Above all 
lending is done on an individualized basis. But all these define a lending paradigm; in 
this case a liberal-individualistic paradigm that makes loans inaccessible to the poor, 
and one that cannot be successfully applied to address the crucial issues of 
microenterprise growth, employment creation and poverty reduction in South Africa.  
Yet, South Africa needs a strong intervention in the microenterprise sector if only to 
begin to make a dent on the legacies of apartheid and help tackle the problem of 
structural unemployment that has literally disfigured the society. Existing lending 
paradigm, which drives South Africa’s sophisticated banking industry, cannot address 
this problem.  Indeed, it primarily explains why the private banks generally avoid the 
historically unbanked and why their capacity to deal with microcredit – a type of 
specialized lending - has remained largely undeveloped. 
 
Even in the South African microcredit sector, existing lending practices do not 
adequately bolster microenterprise credit access.  As the data in chapter five of this 
work show, over 95% of the loans disbursed by this sector are consumption credit 
extended to salary earners and pensioners.  In a nutshell, microcredit in South Africa 
is little more than an institutionalized salary advance scheme, servicing mainly people 
in the so-called ‘first economy’.  A striking insight gained in the course of researching 
for this work is that the South African microcredit sector wears the paradigmatic 
prisms of the conventional lending sector, which sees the poor as bad credit risks, to 
be avoided outright or courted with extreme caution.  Contrast this with the prism 
offered by Grameen Bank or BancoSol, which sees the poor as good credit risks.  
Indeed, for Grameen Bank, the ‘not-so-poor’ are the bad credit risks!  Because of 
using a ‘wrong’ prism to view the reality of ‘the poor’, and presuming people a ‘credit 
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risk’ until proved otherwise, the South African microcredit sector has failed to 
develop lending mechanisms that can bring the poor into the mainstream of economic 
activities and thereby stimulate new levels of economic growth in the country. 
 
Microfinance, as the Grameen Bank example has demonstrated, cannot succeed on 
the strictly liberal-individualistic model used by conventional banks, and conventional 
banks cannot meaningfully contribute to microenterprise development and the 
eradication of pre-structured poverty (such as is uniquely the problem in South 
Africa) using that paradigm.  Specific features like group lending, lending to women, 
lending without collateral, lending based on ‘trust’, moderate interest rate charges, 
and other supporting features eliminate to a large extent, the problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard, and ensure that credit goes to who credit is due. Grameen 
Bank’s records demonstrate that pro-poor lending is not inherently riskier than formal 
sector lending. 
 
It must be emphasized that Grameen Bank model is based on a specific ethnographic 
understanding of the poor in Bangladesh, and it is an understanding that society has 
certain norms (such as the norms of collectivism) that can be harnessed for 
microenterprise credit operations.  More importantly, the Grameen model sees the 
norms of collectivism as the defining social structure of the world of the poor. The 
question of whether such norms can be found in South African townships or only 
exists in rural Bangladesh does not arise.  As chapter four of this work has shown, no 
society is exclusively ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’; collectivist norms exist in every 
society.   
 
The South African microcredit sector flounders because of its inability to mitigate the 
problem of information asymmetries.  But mitigating information asymmetries 
between lender and borrower in the microfinance sector - and hence unleashing the 
power of the unbanked millions - rests on understanding, identifying and harnessing 
the collectivist norms referred in this work.  As things stand in the sector (and this is 
confirmed by the data in chapter five and the impression given to this researcher in 
the field) microcredit providers in South Africa consider their client base saturated.  
That is to say, credit providers tacitly believe that the people who have not yet been 
reached are the ‘bad credit risks’! 
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Khula Enterprise Finance and other nonprofit microfinance intermediaries provide an 
example in South Africa of the emancipatory potentials of microenterprise lending, 
although so far they have made only modest impact.  On the basis of the data in 
chapter five, some reasons can be deduced as to why their impact is limited – indeed, 
specific factors that limit the lenders’ effectiveness are identifiable.  One, the 
development lenders are few in relation to the enormity of microenterprise credit 
needs.  Two, although the KhulaStart scheme is based on the United Nations 
microcredit model (which is a Grameen Bank replication), some of the key features of 
that model (like compulsory savings for borrowers) are not in full operation.  Three, 
by charging registration fees – a strategy not used by Grameen Bank – loans may be 
avoided especially by the very poor.  Four, and most importantly, the methods of 
identifying eligible borrowers appear insensitive to the reality that most historically 
unbanked South Africans will be selected out of a scheme that was meant to empower 
them.  This could mean that even the methods adopted by the development lenders are 
diluted or unduly influenced by the conventional paradigm that pre-classifies people 
as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ credit risks.  Indeed, as this researcher found, microcredit retail 
outlets have on occasion had to return unutilized loan funds to Khula on the premise 
that there are no ‘qualified’ or ‘eligible’ borrowers. 
 
Access to credit in the formal financial sector leads to stabilization in income, wealth 
creation and capital formation, and capital formation increases productive capacities 
of individuals and firms.  These ultimately lead to economic growth. To those that 
utilize informal credit markets, access to credit should to some extent serve the same 
purposes as those of the formal financial sector.  It should not simply be about 
‘income stabilization’ (which is the argument of the South African promoters of 
consumption microcredit).  It should principally be about helping the poor and the 
economically disadvantaged to increase their productive capacities; that is, ultimately 
making them creators of wealth (which is what Grameen Bank does).  
 
If the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal of halving extreme poverty by 
2015 is to be realised, and if this goal is to be met locally in South Africa, job creation 
in the informal economy should be stimulated through access to financial services, 
especially credit. If credit is to stimulate activities in the informal sector, a good 
understanding of the world of the poor must be gained.  In other words, there must be 
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a sound understanding of the economic potentials of those conventionally pre-
classified as ‘bad credit risks’ – that is people traditionally considered as presenting 
the greatest risks of adverse selection and moral hazard.  Appropriate methods of 
promoting microenterprise credit access in this segment of the population must then 
be adopted.  Although the present policies of the South African government are, in 
theory, geared towards job creation especially among the poor majority, the 
challenges faced by the microlending sector call for urgent policy intervention.  
 
6.3 Recommendations 
 
The Grameen Bank microcredit model represents a benchmark for microenterprise 
credit and enjoys numerous replications around the world. This thesis emphasizes 
microenterprise credit; therefore, the following recommendations are made with 
reference to Grameen Bank microcredit model, and cover two broad policy areas: 
action by banks and KhulaStart credit delivery paradigm/method. 
  
If microcredit is to be expanded to reach the vast majority of South Africans that need 
it, commercial banks must be involved. According to Harper (2004:7), often, banks 
shun getting involved in microcredit not necessarily because of perceived risks and 
doubts about profitability, but because they lack the requisite knowledge and skills to 
effectively function in this somewhat specialized sector.  They also face 
organizational constraints and have negative attitudes towards such lending. Although 
effort by ABSA, Standard Bank and Nedcor to serve the low income market in South 
Africa have already met with failure (Schoombie, 2000:751), the experience of 
BancoSol in Bolivia illustrates that commercial microfinance banking can be a 
profitable venture.  BancoSol has creatively blended development-oriented banking 
with commercial banking ethos to create one of the world’s best examples of a 
successful commercial microfinance bank.   
 
A locally relevant innovation for South Africa could be to take advantage of the 
country’s sophisticated financial infrastructure and blend Grameen Bank ethos and 
strategies with those of BancoSol to create an initiative that unleashes the economic 
potential of the country’s poor millions.  Mzansi account does not exactly fall within 
the rubric of this recommendation, as it is merely a parody of conventional 
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individualized banking that, if not properly monitored, could expose more ordinary 
people to exploitation1.  The starting point would be for banks to reappraise their 
conventional paradigm of who constitutes a ‘credit risk’, and what economic 
potentials abound in the segment of the population traditionally pre-classified as a 
‘bad credit risk’.  
 
Microenterprise lending is specialized and is best approached with specialized 
methodologies, such as those used by Grameen Bank and BancoSol. The group 
lending methodology, for example, significantly reduces transaction costs - a major 
deterrent to banks in this business - by eliminating to a large extent the cost of 
screening loan applicants, monitoring, and enforcement of ‘restrictive covenants’. It 
also substitutes for collateral especially if joint liability is enforced. Banks may find 
this a useful strategy for bridging information asymmetries and increasing 
microenterprise access.  But, as emphasized earlier, this is not simply an issue of 
methods: the devil is in the paradigm. 
 
Government should give incentives to banks as a way of encouraging microenterprise 
credit, and do this with a clear understanding that the peculiar South African situation 
demands the active involvement of the private banking sector which is already very 
highly developed.  One such incentive is to guarantee microenterprise loans.  Indeed, 
because pro-poor microfinance could be quite expensive in a country like South 
Africa with a huge pre-structured problem of poverty (Baumann 2001:17), 
government must see its role in this sector as paramount.  Although fund guarantees 
throw up many difficulties, among which is the ratio in which the risk of default could 
be shared between guarantor and bank (Schoombie, 2000:762), guaranteeing loanable 
funds does encourage banks to undertake microenterprise lending. 
 
                                                 
1 Mzansi account holders are not entitled to any form of credit and do not enjoy all the services 
extended to regular savings or current account holders.  For this reason, they pay only a fraction of 
regular bank charges – an issue the banks make a huge premium out of.  However, it is generally 
believed that South African bank charges are probably the highest in the world (Businessowner, 2004); 
therefore, Mzansi account holders  - who are mainly from the historically disadvantaged segment of the 
population  - could actually be paying more than what would be considered ‘normal’ bank charges in 
other countries.  The possibility that the poor might be heading for exploitation is confirmed by the fact 
that since the launching of the scheme, most of the banks have made it clear that they admit Mzansi 
clients in the strong  hope that they will eventually ‘graduate’ into the ‘normal’ product categories and 
pay the full service charges. 
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Some observers maintain that effort to encourage banks into microenterprise lending 
will yield less result because of the image they want to maintain in the face of global 
competition and the need to boost confidence in foreign investors. But it can also be 
argued that global competitiveness does substitute for the need to stimulate locally 
sustainable economic development. Indeed, global competitiveness and global 
relevance are not necessarily antithetical. Banks should give priority to the needs of 
the local economy and support its growth, and government should encourage efforts 
taken by banks in this direction.  Ultimately, due to South Africa’s unique situation, 
pro-poor microlending is better done through government-backed MFI’s and/or banks 
with government-subsidized funds.  Khula Enterprise Finance does guarantee bank 
credits to small and medium enterprise operators; it does not guarantee loans for the 
microenterprise sector. 
 
Since the KhulaStart scheme is based on the United Nations microcredit model, it 
should, alongside its microenterprise emphasis, encourage savings and possibly make 
savings a part of loan conditionalities.  The secondary emphasis on savings is 
important for consumption smoothening and checks the possibility of borrowers 
diverting microenterprise loans to consumption-related purposes. This 
recommendation is particularly important because microcredit clients (both present 
and prospective) are the most unlikely to accumulate savings elsewhere.   
 
KhulaStart targets the very poor; therefore, it is unnecessary to test borrower 
commitment by imposing registration fees. Ordinarily, the very poor are very fearful 
and intimidated to ask for loans. An administrative expense, no matter how small, 
could further discourage their participation in microcredit schemes.   
 
Grameen Bank begins with the belief that everyone, including the poor (who also are 
often illiterate) do have skills that can be utilized.  Within this paradigm, the poor are 
credit worthy until proved otherwise.  KhulaStart retail outlets have had to return 
funds back to Khula on the grounds that potential borrowers are illiterate and 
therefore ineligible for loans.  Khula, like conventional banks, must fundamentally 
redefine the concept of ‘credit risks’ if it hopes to stimulate economic development in 
the historically excluded and underprivileged segment of the population. Everyone 
has a potential to create wealth, and microenterprise development is essentially about 
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unlocking this potential in the target population rather than approaching people with a 
notion that they are either ‘good’ or ‘bad credit risks’.  
 
In the 1999 annual report, Khula management lamented that the organization would 
have made a better impact on the South African society if its retail outlets ‘shared 
their vision and conviction’. This was an indictment of the differential practices 
among KhulaStart retail outlets, and underlines the imperative of concerted and 
regular training through which Khula’s vision could be imparted to the MCOs.  
 
6.4 Limitations of the research 
 
The research method adopted in this study required collection of primary data through 
interviews with private sector microlenders and KhulaStart retail outlets – Libec in 
Umtata and Hlumisanani in Port Elizabeth. Because the researcher had no funding, 
interviews were limited to these few outlets against original intention of interviewing 
as many outlets as possible in the Eastern Cape. The researcher interviewed 
Hlumisanani staff in person, while respondents at Libec were interviewed 
telephonically. 
 
Effort was also made to telephonically interview responsible Khula Enterprise 
Finance staff in Johannesburg, but this was not successful. No one at the other end of 
Khula’s toll-free number seemed able to coordinate a telephone interview. On one 
occasion when a call successfully went through, a junior manager requested the 
researcher to send the questionnaire by mail, which the researcher did.  However, till 
the completion of this thesis, no response was received, and repeated calls to request 
the return of the questionnaire yielded no results. The researcher thus had to rely on 
data gathered from the retail outlets in Port Elizabeth and Mthatha and relevant 
secondary data obtained from web resources. Conclusions drawn are therefore based 
on information available to the researcher. 
 
6.5 Suggestions for further research 
 
Several studies have been done on the microcredit industry in South Africa, touching 
on different areas. The South African NGOs and MFIs lend only to microenterprises 
 91
and through their activities, support the microbusiness sector. Impact studies should 
be conducted to ascertain the extent to which businesses, which these organizations 
support have progressed from being survivalist to those that can make meaningful 
economic impact on the lives of those who utilize microenterprise loans. Microloans 
should help people to enter the world of microenterprises rather than create mere 
survival businesses.  Such loans should help to make microbusinesses self-sustaining. 
 
AIDS has reached a pandemic stage in South Africa and seems most prevalent in the 
target market of microcredit products – that is, low-income earners and the poor. As 
yet, there is no empirical research into the associations between HIV/AIDS and bad 
debt in the microenterprise credit sector; current estimates regarding such associations 
are merely anecdotal. Such studies are necessary because in the course of this 
research, respondents commonly mentioned HIV/AIDS as a major cause of loan 
default and bad debt. 
 
Finally, microenterprise credit targets mostly women. This researcher encountered 
allegations in the field as to men’s interference in loan performance.  Appropriate 
research should be done in South Africa to ascertain partner resistance and domestic 
abuse as a factor in loan default and bad debt. 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE – REGISTERED PRIVATE SECTOR 
MICROLENDERS 
 
Section 1: 
 
1. What type of loan do you typically grant? 
 
- loan to meet up short term financial needs 
- loan to start small or expand an existing one? 
- Housing loan 
- Educational loan 
- Other ………………………………………….(please specify) 
 
2. Of the total number of loan applicants during the last 24 months, what 
percentage were successful 
- 1-10% 
- 11-20% 
- 21-20% 
- 31-30% 
- 41-50% 
- 51-60% 
- 61-70% 
- Above 70% 
 
3. Of the total number of your loan grantees during the last 24 months, please 
indicate percentage according to the type of loan (Tick as appropriate): 
 
Short term 
Needs 
Business 
startup/Expansion
 
Housing Education Other (Please 
specify) 
1-10% 1-10% 1-10% 1-10% 1-10% 
11-20% 11-20% 11-20% 11-20% 11-20% 
21-30% 21-30% 21-30% 21-30% 21-20% 
31-40% 31-40% 31-40% 31-40% 31-40% 
41-50% 41-50% 41-50% 41-50% 41-50% 
Above 50% Above 50% Above 50% Above 50% Above 50% 
 
 
4. To which of the following categories do your loan grantees fall? 
Salary earners…..Why?……………………………………………….. 
Self-employed…. Why?………………………………………………. 
People who want to start new business Why?………………………… 
People who want to expand existing business Why…………………… 
Unemployed…Why? ………………………………………………….. 
Students…. (Why?) ……………………………………………………  
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Other (Please specify) Why?…………………………………………... 
 
5. Of your loan grantees during the last 24 months, what are their educational 
backgrounds: 
- No formal Education 
- Primary Education 
- Secondary Education 
- Post Matric Education 
- Tertiary Education (Technikon/University) 
- Other (Please specify) 
 
6. Of your loan grantees during the last 24 months, what are their levels of 
income? 
- Up to R6,000 per annum  (Specify percentage………………) 
- R6001 -12000 per annum   (Specify percentage………………) 
- R12001 -18000 per annum   (Specify percentage………………) 
- R18001 - 24000 per annum   (Specify percentage………………) 
- R24001 - 30000 per annum (Specify percentage………………) 
- R30001  -36000 per annum (Specify percentage………………) 
- R36001 - 42000 per annum (Specify percentage………………) 
- R42001 – 48000 per annum (Specify percentage…………….) 
- R48,001 – 54000 per annum ( Specify percentage…………..) 
- R54001 – 60000 per annum (Specify percentage…………….) 
- Above R60000 per annum (Specify percentage………………) 
 
7. What are the most important criteria you take into account before granting a 
loan? 
 
8. Are applicants expected to have collateral in order to be granted a loan? 
- Yes…………. 
- No …………. 
 
9. If yes to No. 8 above, what type of collateral? 
- Land/Landed Property 
- Secure employment? 
- Surety 
- Valuable personal belongings 
- Other (Please specify) 
 
10. If no collateral is required, why not? 
 
 
Section 2 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
What is the average loan size that you have given out in the last 24 months? 
Do you monitor the end use of the loans you grant? 
- If yes why?  
- If no, why not? 
-  
From your experience what do you think your clients use the loans for? 
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4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10.
11.
12.
13.
How do you ensure loan repayment? 
Do you visit your client before and after a loan has been granted? 
- If yes why? 
-      If not why not? 
Do you have specific staff that monitor your clients? 
 
In the last 24 months, have you had any bad debt? 
If yes, what is the size of your bad debt ……… 
Which categories of your clients contributed significantly to your bad debt? 
 What is the gender distribution of your clients in the last 24 months? 
Male___%, Female___% 
 In the last 24 months have you lent to people as a group? If yes for what 
purpose was the loan? 
 Have you at any time specifically targeted low income and unemployed 
people as loan beneficiaries? 
 What steps have you taken to ensure that your loan reaches low income and 
unemployed people? 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE – KHULASTART RETAIL OUTLETS 
 
 
 
1.What criteria must be met before a loan is granted? 
 
2.What sort of collateral do you require from applicants? 
 
Land/Landed Property 
Secure employment? 
Surety 
Valuable personal belongings 
Other (Please specify) 
 
3.What is the average loan size that you have given out in the last 24 months? 
 
4.Of the number of applicants, what percentage actually got loans during the last 24 
months?  
      
1-10% 
11-20% 
21-20% 
31-30% 
41-50% 
51-60% 
61-70% 
Above 70% 
 
 
5. Are there specific types of business you favour with regards to the granting of 
loans? 
  
6. If so why? 
 
7. Do you monitor the end use of the loans you give? 
   If yes why? If no, why not? 
 
8. From your experience what do you think your clients use the loans for? 
 
9. What steps do you take to ensure loan repayment? 
 
10. Do you have specific staff who monitor compliance to loan terms and who also 
assist in tracking loan grantees to ensure successful loan repayment? 
 
13.What is the size of your bad debt? 
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14.What is the gender distribution of your clients in the last 24 months? Male___%, 
Female___% 
 
15.How many microentrepreneurs have you lent to in the last 24 months? 
 
16.Do you monitor their progress? If yes how successful are they? 
 
17.Have you lent to people in a group before? 
  
18 If yes for what purpose was it? 
 
19.In your own opinion what could be done to enable the unemployed to benefit from 
your microloan? 
  
20.What steps have you taken to ensure that your loan reaches low income and 
unemployed people? 
